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THE ARMY DOCTRINE AND TRAINING BULLETIN

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Canada's Professional Journal on Army Issues

AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

Master-Corporal Richard P. Thorne

ISTAR SENSOR INTEGRATION: A NON-MELTING POT OPTION

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**"GLOBAL MOBILE": FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, PEACEKEEPING
AND THE ORIGINS OF FORCES MOBILE COMMAND, 1958-1964**

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**ABORIGINAL PARTICIPATION IN CANADIAN MILITARY SERVICE:
HISTORIC AND CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTS**

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WHICH WAY TO THE BEACH? THE CASE FOR "AMPHIBIOSITY"

Major Peter J. Williams, CD

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THE ARMY DOCTRINE AND TRAINING BULLETIN

Canada's Professional Journal on Army Issues

This is an official publication of Land Force Command and is published quarterly. The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin is dedicated to the dissemination and discussion of doctrinal and training concepts, ideas and opinions by all army personnel and those civilians with an interest in doctrinal, training and other military matters. Articles on related subjects such as leadership, ethics, technology and military history are also invited. Considered, reasoned debate is central to the intellectual health of the army and the production of valid doctrine and training policies. Articles promoting thought and discussion are therefore welcome. All ranks and personnel from other environments are encouraged to contribute. Opinions expressed in the articles remain those of the author and do not represent departmental or Canadian Forces policy. The doctrine, training and other updates do not represent authority for action on that particular topic. All published material remains the copyright of the Department of National Defence and may be used with written permission from the Managing Editor.

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Articles of any length will be considered for publication, the ideal length being 3000 to 6000 words. Articles can be submitted in either official language. Usage and spelling are in accordance with *The Canadian Style: A Guide to Writing and Editing* (Minister of Supply and Service 1997) and *Le guide du rédacteur de l'administration fédérale* – both are available via www.pwgsc.gc.ca/termium, libraries or bookstores; and *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* or *Le Petit Robert*. Supporting tables, charts and images must be provided by the author and should not be embedded in the text. Articles must include endnotes. Contributors must include a brief biography citing their academic background, noteworthy military or other experience, key courses and current position. Articles can be submitted via e-mail or regular mail (a disc copy must be included). All submissions will be reviewed by an Editorial Board and contributors will be notified by the Managing Editor on the status of their submission. The Managing Editor reserves the right to make minor editorial changes to grammar or style. Authors will be contacted should their submission require revision.

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Contributions to the Stand-Up Table should be no longer than 1000 words and can be made anytime. Every effort will be made to publish these in the earliest issue possible. Comments on articles should be submitted as soon as possible following the publication of that article.

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CORRESPONDENCE

All contributions and correspondence should be sent to the Managing Editor, Major John R. Grodzinski, as follows:

The Managing Editor
Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Land Force Doctrine and Training System
PO Box, 17000 Stn Forces
Kingston ON K7K 7B4

Telephone: (613) 541-5010, extension 4874
Fax: (631) 541-4478
Internet e-mail: mail854g@dnd.ca

EDITING AND LAYOUT

The final editing of each issue is performed by the Army Publishing Office, Land Force Doctrine and Training System, Kingston, Ontario:

English Editors: Lieutenant(N) Brian Lawrie-Munro,
Ms. Karen Johnstone, Ms. Jenny Turner,
Mr. Greg Taylor.

French and English Editors: Mr. Gilles Langlois,
Mrs. Thérèse Lessard.

Layout and proofreading services are provided by:



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Part of Our Heritage



The Company of 100 Associates was formed in 1627 to develop France's empire in North America. Its monopoly ended when New France became a Royal Colony in 1663. This image is of a soldier from the Company, c. 1650. (courtesy Department of National Defence)



A member of the Upper Canada Incorporated Militia in 1813. A shortage of cloth forced these soldiers to be dressed in green jackets. (courtesy Department of National Defence)



To halt the absorption of the Pontifical States into Italy, Pope Pius IX raised a corps in 1860 from several Catholic countries. In 1867, an appeal to support the Pope was made in Montreal and some 429 people volunteered for the Pontifical Zouave Regiment. They were repatriated in 1870. (courtesy Department of National Defence)



A soldier of the Royal Canadian Volunteers, c. 1798, raised in Upper and Lower Canada following an increase in tensions with the United States. This two-battalion regiment existed between 1795 and 1802. (courtesy Parks Canada)

Guest Editorial

One Reservist's Thoughts...

by Master-Corporal David Auger, 3 Field Engineer Regiment

There is no question that a new millennium has come, but did it take the reserve force with it?

Every year we are losing more personnel than we are able to recruit. Some blame it on the fact that the economy is stronger, which means fewer young people are seeking employment with the Canadian Forces; others say it's simply a case of bad publicity. If we lived in a fantasy world, we could keep raising salaries until we reached our desired employment level. However, the reality is that we live in a world of tight budgets, which means that continually increasing salary is not a plausible solution.

A new unique solution must be adopted, a solution which caters more to the needs of our reserve force personnel, which are mostly students. What about giving students bursaries in order to pay for tuition and books? Why not contact city officials and have them give reservists a break on public transport? What about making some qualifications compatible with similar civilian qualifications?

Many students use the first summer of pay for tuition, only to release from the Canadian Forces the following September. Paying a student's tuition is actually more important than receiving a pay raise because, no matter what happens, the student knows that his/her tuition would be paid. In return for guaranteeing their tuition, the Canadian Forces would have reservists sign a two- or three-year contract. These new members would have to show up on every exercise, meet expectations and be available for at least one UN or NATO call out. If these conditions were not met, the Canadian Forces would

reserve the right to not issue the bursary or to simply release that member.

Many reservists use the public transportation system as a means of getting to and from their respective units. Convincing city officials to give reservists free public transportation might be a little tricky, unless we convince them that having us around can pay dividends for them as well. For example, during the ice storm, our units helped many of the surrounding towns around Montreal by cutting trees, providing firewood and performing other services. Reservists were an instrumental part of the flood assistance effort in Manitoba. Every year the 3 Field Engineer Regiment builds a Bailey bridge for the Old Port of Montreal. The city uses it for various activities and festivals. Maybe municipalities have other needs such as temporary shelters or security during parades.

How many times has a reservist gone to look for a job but scared a potential employer away because his/her resume contained military qualifications that were misunderstood? If we could guarantee members that some of their military courses would be com-

patible with civilian courses, it would aid them in finding a job once they have finished their service in the reserves. A good example is the Air Force unit in Abbotsford, BC, where the unit is actually located in a school. The convenience factor surely provides extra incentive for those in that school to join the reserves. Most reserve units are located near colleges or universities. How about trying to place more units in or at least near some of these schools across Canada?

Some of the above mentioned ideas would cost money, but once units are running at full strength, recruiting costs could be cut back. With the number of applicants that would apply, units would be able to pick and choose only the best of candidates, which would mean a longer average career for the reservists with higher competence.

This is the new millennium, which hopefully means the espousal of new ideas designed to deal with a more modern world where the reserve force can be seen as a vital part of the Canadian Forces.



ABOUT OUR GUEST EDITORIAL AUTHOR...

Master-Corporal Auger joined the Canadian Forces in February 1994 as a Field Engineer. He was promoted to his current rank in 1997. Since 1998 he has been an instructor at Camp Vimy in USS Valcartier during the summer training season. In July of this year, he successfully completed the QL6A Course at CFB Gagetown. He is a section commander with 3 Field Engineer Regiment and has also worked in recruiting from January 1999 to February 2000. Academically, Master-Corporal Auger completed a DEC in Pure and Applied science at John Abbott College in 1996 and is currently studying Economics at Concordia University.

From the Directorate of Army Doctrine

The Land Equipment Management System (LEMS)

GENERAL

The Land Equipment Management System (LEMS) is one of four systems that comprise the combat function of Sustainment.¹ Sustainment, and therefore the LEMS, provides to the commander some of the essential elements of the overall unit or formation's combat power. Given the complexity and cost of modern weapons systems and combat vehicles, and the extensive lead-time required for their production, modern battlefield equipment is a scarce resource. The support system of the equipment requires tight and efficient management practices but must also be capable of operating and surviving under battlefield conditions. LEMS is a fully integrated, coordinated and self-sufficient system that encompasses the entire spectrum of equipment management, from the factory right through to the front lines. LEMS organizations are responsible to their respective commanders for maintaining the capability of their equipment at the state of readiness that is required to support the plan. The LEMS staff provides a commander a single point of contact for all land technical equipment-related issues.

The aim of this update is to highlight changes in doctrine introduced by B-GL-342-001/FP-001 *Land Equipment Management System*.²

OVERVIEW AND DEFINITIONS

Before proceeding with a discussion of the LEMS, it is necessary to define the system and introduce new terminology.

The role of the LEMS is to maintain the operational capability of all land technical equipment. The LEMS is made up of a number of equipment management processes, some of which are carried out at all levels from strategic to tactical. Equipment management is the process by which the equipment is

planned for, acquired, fielded, maintained and disposed of. Equipment management processes necessarily involve support from numerous organizations such as the Army staff, Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), CF Training schools, allied forces and industry. These processes (acquisition, research and design, maintenance, engineering change, planning, advice, inventory control and disposal) and their relation to the levels of Sustainment are shown in Figure 1.

Within the LEMS, a classification system has been developed to identify the maintenance required on a piece of equipment (equipment is defined as all non-expendable items needed to equip a unit or a formation). This classification system is used to identify the nature of maintenance work needed and ensures that the equipment is directed to the most appropriate LEMS organization and, as a result, is returned to service as quickly as possible. Figure 2 provides an illustration of Equipment Configuration Code (ECC) versus selected LEMS functions and is a change in terminology.

The remainder of this update will discuss the LEMS support that corre-

sponds to the three levels of Sustainment—strategic, operational and tactical.

STRATEGIC LEVEL

The LEMS at the strategic level is focussed within the resources and activities of the Equipment Management Teams (EMTs) of the Director-General Land Equipment Program Management (DGLEPM). In addition, a range of Canadian Forces (CF), Department of National Defence (DND), allied forces and industrial capabilities provide in-depth LEMS support services beyond those within operational and tactical level LEMS organizations in both peace and war. The LEMS is a subset of the overall Material Acquisition and Support (MA&S) system of the DND/CF. The MA&S concept envisions seamless, end-to-end provision of equipment and associated support from industry through to the tactical units of any deployed contingent.

The management of MA&S equipment capabilities is based upon the EMTs within DGLEPM, which have been organized into multi-skilled teams responsible for specific equipment capabilities. These teams combine staff and




Figure 1 - LEMS Processes

	New ECC	Old ECC
S	Serviceable. The equipment is available for immediate use.	No change
I	Integral. Requires maintenance by the Integral LEMS organization.	X
C	Close. Requires maintenance by a Close Support LEMS organization.	Y1
G	General. Requires maintenance by a General Support LEMS organization.	Y2
D	Depot. Requires maintenance by a Depot organization.	Z
BER	Beyond Economical Repair under current conditions.	No change
BR	Beyond Repair.	No change

Figure 2 - LEMS ECC

resources into a single team that manages the application of varied skills (in project, engineering, technical support, inventory, financial and procurement management disciplines) to fulfil life cycle activities of both acquisition and support phases through optimum application of diverse MA&S processes. By placing both a broad skill-set and full life cycle mandates within a single team, the EMT concept reduces information and responsibility handoffs. It also ensures that the EMT leader is both empowered and charged with balancing resources across his assigned responsibilities. Lastly, it provides an integrated focal point to respond to needs and manage associated resources. An example of a typical EMT is shown in Figure 3.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL

LEMS at the operational level encompasses the in-theatre support beyond the tactical level, basically providing support to equipment from arrival in theatre to issue to units/formations. At this level, the LEMS is largely an Equipment staff function designed to undertake more complex equipment management functions to sustain campaigns and major operations. These operations will be complex and they will likely be both combined and joint in nature.

Operational level LEMS units differ from their tactical level counterparts in that their services are more functionally

based. All general support (GS) maintenance, supply, and transportation units contribute to LEMS at the operational level. GS maintenance units provide GS repair and recovery. They are semi-static, performing more complex corrective maintenance tasks than close support (CS) units, usually in support of the supply system or equipment not supported by the CS units. Unlike the CS units whose repairs are limited by time, the capabilities of GS units are limited by the amount of maintenance resources available to them.

There will be many headquarters which will operate together at the operational level—Canadian national headquarters, joint headquarters, Joint Task Force Headquarters and/or combined headquarters—each providing a LEMS function. Whether some or all of the following headquarters exist, the responsibilities and staff functions will be carried out regardless in order to link the strategic to operational levels or operational

to tactical levels. The J4 LEMS operational staff manages equipment, including vehicles, weapon systems, repair parts, etc., on behalf of the operational commander. More specific responsibilities include technical advice, liaison, equipment related contingency plans and orders, establishing policies such as Battle Damage Repair (BDR), controls on equipment stocks and Controlled Assemblies (CA), monitoring maintenance status of equipment and repair units, repair parts management (including scaling and stocking of repair parts), technical training, and the management of maintenance information and information systems. All of the LEMS processes shown in Figure 1 and represented at the strategic level are represented at the operational staff level.

TACTICAL LEVEL

At the tactical level, the LEMS is concerned mainly with restoring the capability of equipment through repairs and limited equipment replacement but also involves planning and coordinating the best use of its resources through work backloading or cross-loading. All equipment is segregated (identifying that which is critical to the operation) into priority and non-priority equipment based on the commander's priorities. Generally, priority equipment will include A vehicles (combat, reconnaissance and armoured engineer), essential B vehicles (command and communications) and major weapons systems. At the tactical level, the LEMS operates as follows:

Integral support. Integral Support is the organic LEMS support provided to a unit commanding officer (CO) and is responsible for all equipment within that unit. At this level, the work focus is put on equipment casualties that can be restored




Figure 3 – Typical EMT

to serviceability within a short time (usually less than four hours). The work comprises operator maintenance, preventive maintenance, limited BDR, minor equipment replacement, modifications, extrication and righting, backloading to the Equipment Collecting Point (ECP), route clearance, equipment denial (destruction) and equipment accounting. Most priority equipment support is performed as far forward as the tactical situation will permit (A1 echelon) so that it can be returned to battle immediately, allowing for the maximisation of combat power. Non-priority equipment is usually backloaded to the A2 echelon, where it is restored to a serviceable condition. Integral LEMS organizations consist of all maintenance platoons/ troops/ detachments within units.

Close Support (CS). CS is the intimate LEMS support provided to the commander of a formation. It is responsible for the priority equipment that can be restored to operational capability within a day. The work is limited to extensive BDR and corrective maintenance through replacement of major assemblies; it is performed directly at the casualty location. If required, CS will

augment unit LEMS integral support resources. Even if the LEMS CS resources operate within unit lines, they are actually based out of the Brigade Support Area (BSA). The maintenance company of the independent brigade group service battalion performs a CS LEMS function.

General Support (GS). GS is the LEMS support provided to all elements of the force. It is responsible for the non-priority equipment that can be restored to operational capability within seven days. GS also supports units that do not have integral LEMS resources and augments the capabilities of any Integral and CS LEMS organizations that have a shortage of resources or an over-abundance of work. The support includes corrective maintenance through replacement of major assemblies, modification, reconditioning of sub-components, cross-loading of casualties to lateral LEMS organizations, backloading from ECP to the backloading point (BLP) and route clearance. The rearward location of GS LEMS organizations permits them to backload non-serviceable equipment to a centralized location where more resources can be dedicated

to production versus battlefield survivability. When supporting the Canadian division, the LEMS GS organization will operate from the Division Support Area (DSA); it will operate from the Corps Forward Support Area (CFSA) when supporting the Independent Brigade Group. The maintenance battalion of the Divisional Support Group (DISGP) performs a GS LEMS function.

CONCLUSION

B-GL-342-001/FP-001 *The Land Equipment Management System* will be published shortly and formalized as part of the Army's family of doctrine manuals. The LEMS manual introduces some new terminology, but, equally importantly, it documents existing structures and process introduced during the recent past.



This DAD update was prepared by Major James Matson, DLERM 4-5, LEMS Plans.

ENDNOTES

1. B-GL-300-004/FP-001 Land Force Sustainment.
2. This manual replaces B-GL-314-002/FP-001 Maintenance in Battle.

The Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College in Transition

An Important Update for all Army Officers

At the Army Council held on 26/27 October 2000, it was decided that the current two-course model at the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College would be revised. The following update prepared by the Staff College outlines these changes and their impact.

Change has been constant for the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College (CLFCSC) since its relocation to Fort Frontenac from the Royal Military College in 1947. In the years preceding 1959, the program of study was approximately one year long. In 1959, a two-year program was introduced and offered until 1964. Commencing in 1965, a one-year program was re-introduced and remained in effect until 1973, at which time a 20-week program was developed and taught until 1996. In spite of the many changes to the curriculum, the Staff College's aim—"to develop, in selected army officers, the ability to perform command and staff functions in war"—has remained constant.


In 1996, following a yearlong study to identify and eliminate deficiencies associated with the 20-week program, Army Council approved a new two-course model. In order to develop the two new courses, the Staff College cancelled courses for a year with the aim of restarting in 1997. The new model consisted of a 16-week Land Force Staff Course (LFSC) and a 20-week Land Force Command and Staff Course (LFCSC). As before, these courses were offered to junior army officers who were selected to attend.

In order to ensure that the officer corps remains capable of operating in today's complex world, officer education and training is being enhanced and reformed throughout the Canadian Forces. In accordance with the Officer Professional Development (OPD) System and a review of the Officer General Specification (OGS), fundamental changes are forthcoming in the conduct of training at CLFCSC.

opment they need, when they need it, in order to optimize their effectiveness and career potential. As a vital step in this process and as directed by the Commander Land Force Doctrine and Training System (LFDTS), CLFCSC has undertaken a major revision of its program. In a fundamental shift toward uni-

"... a significant backlog of captains and majors must receive command and staff training ..."

versality of officer training, command and staff training at the Staff College will no longer be limited to just a few selected captains and majors. The desired end-state is the provision of command and staff training to all army captains and majors while enhancing quality of life by minimizing the time away from home and garrison.



Based on the principles of universality, train to need and just in time training, the OPD System will ensure that officers are given the required knowledge and skills, consistent with rank, in a timely and efficient manner. The OPD is based on the four pillars of education, training, employment experience and self-development.

The ultimate aim of the OPD System is to ensure that leaders receive the professional education and devel-

Within the OPD System framework, two new courses are being designed for attendance by *all* army captains and majors respectively. These are the Army Operations Course (AOC) for captains and the Army Staff Course (ASC) for majors. Both courses involve a six-week distributed learning (DL) package followed by a residency period at CLFCSC of 11 weeks for the AOC and eight weeks for the ASC. DL is defined as non-residency learning, utilizing a variety of techniques (CD-ROM, web-based technology, audio conferencing, etc.) without the on-site presence of an instructor.

The steady state for these courses will be 250 AOC candidates and 125 ASC candidates annually. The pilot AOC is tentatively scheduled for 2002; the pilot ASC will not be conducted until there are sufficient AOC graduates available.

THE CURRENT SITUATION


Before the new staff training model can be put into effect, a significant backlog of captains and majors must receive command and staff training in order to be employed effectively and to maintain career progression. The immediate need is to conduct the LFCSC for a backlog of approximately 600 officers. Of these, 290 officers are part way through the current SC/CSC model. In addition, approximately 110 officers have been identified by career managers as requiring staff training before being posted into staff positions in APS 2001 and 2002.

In order to ensure a smooth transition to the new format, LFDTS has cancelled the LFSC and directed CLFCSC to conduct a series of transitional courses, designated Transition Command and Staff Course (TCSC), during the next two to three years beginning in January 2001. Up to four transitional courses will be conducted in a given year.

Candidates for the TCSC fall into several categories, in order of priority:

- majors without the LFCSC;
- graduates of the LFSC likely to be promoted;
- officers with no formal staff training who are in staff positions or will be posted to one in APS 2001 (train to need);
- graduates of the LFSC and officers granted waivers for the LFSC who are not included in the above categories; and
- captains with strong potential for promotion to major.

The target group for the TCSC, therefore, consists of the backlog of majors and senior captains with no formal staff training as well as a smaller group of less senior captains currently filling or designated for postings that require formal staff training. A modified version of the current LFCSC best meets this training need. Graduates of the TCSC will be granted the CSC qualification as annotated by the symbol "plcsc."



Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, Chief of the General Staff (1951 to 1955), lays the cornerstone to Normandy Hall at the Army Staff College in 1954. Like today's Army, the Army of the 1950s experienced radical change and increasing overseas demands. Since 1947, training officers in performing command and staff functions in war has remained central to Staff College philosophy.

HOW WILL THE TCSC BE CONDUCTED?

With the exception of the first serial in January 2001, the TCSC will be 16 weeks in duration and include three tutorials. A six-week DL package will make up tutorial one. This will be followed by a ten-week residency phase at CLFCSC, consisting of tutorials two and three. The first serial of the TCSC (01) will be reserved for LFSC graduates only and will have no DL component. LFSC graduates who are unable to attend TCSC 01 will be exempted from the DL phase of subsequent courses.

The DL portion is designed to give candidates without the LFSC qualification the necessary level of background knowledge (doctrine, structures, basic staff tools, etc.) required for the TCSC.

Candidates will be considered on course once they commence the DL package. They will be responsive to CLFCSC but remain at their home bases or locations. CLFCSC DS will supervise each student throughout the DL phase and act as a mentor for the student. At the completion of the DL segment, students will be required to pass an entrance exam before being allowed to undertake the residency portion of the training.

There will be a requirement for students to report to one of five central locations across Canada for a short period at both the start and end of the DL training for a series of interactive sessions with their DS and fellow students. The five locations are Edmonton, Petawawa, Kingston, Valcartier and Gagetown. TD funding for this training will be a CLFCSC responsibility.

“... students will be required to pass an entrance exam before being allowed to undertake the residency portion of the training ...”

The ten-week residency portion of the TCSC will concentrate on core CSC topics. The curriculum will concentrate on the fundamentals of conflict, command, ethics, domestic and peace support operations, and warfighting staff skills reinforced through a series of brigade and division level exercises. There will not be sufficient time to deliver most of the professional development components (military history, technology, communication skills, national security studies and the field study trip) of the current LFSC/LFCSC. Since the future professional development packages for the new OPD model will be presented in a modular format and in many

cases use DL methodologies, it should be possible for these transitional officers to achieve the missing professional development later in their careers.

COURSE COMPOSITION

The Director Land Personnel will be responsible for determining the numbers of vacancies by branch for each TCSC. Course composition will be based on the following:

- the course load will consist of six syndicates of 12 students for a total of 72;
- for TCSC 02 and 04, there will be six Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP) students on each serial, thus leaving the remaining 66 vacancies for Canadian students; and
- vacancies will be available for air force officers on each course, less TCSC 01, which is reserved for LFSC graduates. Air force officers will receive an average of four vacancies

on each of the remaining three TCSC serials in 2001.

The failure rate for the residency entrance exam is expected to be low. However, an adequate pool of qualified candidates must be maintained in order to ensure that the residency portion of each course is loaded to full capacity. Initially, 75 students will be loaded on the DL portion (Tutorial 1) of each TCSC in 2001. This figure will be adjusted as experience with the entrance exam is gained.

PREREQUISITES

Candidates for the TCSC must meet the following prerequisites:

- minimum three years in rank as a captain;
- be recommended by commanding officer;
- have successfully completed OPDP 2, 3 and 4; and
- recommended for terms of service conversion.

Additional information is contained on the CLFCSC DIN site at the following address: <http://lfdts-6a.d-kgtn.dnd.ca/clfcsc-cceftc> or on the World Wide Web at: www.army.dnd.ca/clfcsc-cceftc.



TENTATIVE DATES FOR TCSC		
The following courses are planned for 2001 and early 2002:		
Serial	Tutorial 1 (DL)	Tutorials 2 & 3 (Residence)
TCSC 01	N/A	15 Jan 01 - 23 Mar 01
TCSC 02	19 Feb 01 - 30 Mar 01	2 Apr 01 - 8 Jun 01
TCSC 03	21 May 01 - 29 Jun 01	30 Jul 01 - 5 Oct 01
TCSC 04	4 Sep 01 - 12 Oct 01	15 Oct 01 - 21 Dec 01
TCSC 05	5 Nov 01 - 14 Dec 01	14 Jan 02 - 22 Mar 02

An Analysis of Strategic Leadership

by Master-Corporal Richard P. Thorne

Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age, made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will say, 'This was their finest hour.'¹

In the ongoing review of the Canadian Officer Development Program, the issue of strategic leadership will inevitably emerge. So significant and fundamental is this form of leadership that ignoring it would be highly irresponsible. Significance is no guarantor of success, however, as commentators have recently taken direct aim at the failure of strategic leadership in both the civilian and military realms to produce effective internal organizational performance.² Negative conclusions regarding the functionality of strategic leaders highlight a failure in those individuals to live up to executive obligations within their organizations. Moreover, comments such as these hint at a desire of many to reinvigorate the influence of executive leaders. Rarely are lamentations extended for something

unwanted. Encouragingly, efforts designed to unearth the essential characteristics necessary to produce the leadership that has been neglected for so long have been provoked by these calls. In any effort to design a system that is best able to produce effective strategic leadership, it would be prudent to explore the efforts of others in an attempt to identify the essential strategic traits, skills and actions that combine to produce the leadership which is sought after.

Desire does not automatically produce success however. The difficulty in identifying strategic leadership is exacerbated by the presence of perceptual inhibitors that surround leader development. A common mistake is to ascribe too much importance to a single individual. This so-called heroic leader model results from people attempting to explain complex organizational interactions in a manner that fits their assumptions and implicit theories.³ Leaders are therefore stereotyped as possessing a romantic and mystical quality that is capable of leading organizations in the face of uncontrollable natural forces. Reliance on these images is irresponsible however. Strategic leadership is not a function of innate indi-

"A common mistake is to ascribe too much importance to a single individual."

vidual genius. It is grown and developed within individuals as they ascend the leadership ranks of an organization. Despite the realization that a logical and progressive development process possesses considerable utility, the search for leadership genius has not stopped, though the emphasis has changed. Today, technological trends have somewhat supplanted the heroic leader

model. However, the expectations placed on information systems are again mistaken. Information technology has only routinized existing processes; it has not resulted in the wholesale abandonment of traditional attributes.⁴ The cognitive and interpersonal attributes required to lead have not changed as a result of information technology. For example, an increased amount of real-time information will not be a substitute for an ability to decipher meaning out of information overload. The panacea of information technology is therefore not sufficient in and of itself to assure the presence of effective strategic leadership in both peace and war.⁵ Rather, it is the development of talented individuals, possessing the appropriate skill, knowledge, and experience, that will ensure organizations have the strategic leadership that they require.

In defining what is a strategic leader, it is essential to underscore the discussion with a basic definition of what is leadership. For the purpose of this paper, the current CF leadership definition, that leadership is the art of influencing human behaviour in order to accomplish a mission in the manner desired by the leader, will suffice.⁶ It is not the purpose

here to reiterate the debates that whirl around the construction of leadership definitions that encapsulate the essential qualities of that function. Rather, based on this existing definition, the twin components of tactical

and strategic leadership, as will be explained, are enclosed within that definition. In any discussion on strategic leadership, numerous terms can be used interchangeably that denote the same concept. Both strategic leadership and executive leadership, while perhaps being distinct concepts for some, will be considered for the purposes of this paper to be the same concept. "Large, complex

organizations of every type are more alike than different regarding the challenges of attracting, developing and retaining talented people. The greatest similarities in requisite leadership competencies are at the upper organizational levels.”⁷ Moreover, another concept, command, will seem initially to be remarkably similar to strategic leadership, but a distinction between the two can be made to provide the necessary theoretical boundary. Command relies upon the authority bestowed upon an individual to exercise control over military forces, as well as the leadership and management functions that are required to direct those forces to accomplish a mission.⁸ Strategic leaders, in a military context, will frequently display qualities of command. However, commanders at a tactical and operational level, while also able to command, cannot exercise the qualities of a strategic leader. That is, command is not restricted to the upper levels of an organization: platoon commanders can command but they can not be executive leaders, whereas a general can both command and exhibit the qualities of strategic leadership. Therefore, in an effort to encapsulate command into a paradigm of strategic leadership, it must be understood that the qualities of command and strategic leadership have considerable overlap, but neither is fully representative of the other.

Having made these assumptions, strategic leadership as a quality distinct from other forms can be explored. Katz and Kahn (1978) created a model that proposes three distinct levels of leadership. The tactical level of leadership “...concerns the administrative use of existing organizational structures to maintain effective organizational operations.”⁹ The operational level “...involves the embellishment and operationalization of formal structural elements.”¹⁰ The strategic leadership level “...concerns structural origination or change in the organization as a reflection of new policy formulations.”¹¹ Based on these three leadership levels, strategic leadership thus “... connotes management of an overall enterprise, not just a small part; and it implies substantive decision-making responsibilities, not only the interpersonal and social dimensions associated with the word leadership alone.”¹² Simply put, strategic leadership focuses on the people who are in a position, with-



Has a Canadian officer practised strategic leadership? Major-General Frederick Middleton was General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia from 1884 to 1890 and personally led operations against Louis Riel in 1885. But then that was operational command and Middleton was British... (Courtesy National Archives of Canada).

in an organization, to have overall responsibility for an organization and be accountable for its performance.¹³ Although, some could argue that the leaders at all levels are responsible for their own organization no matter how small, executive leadership occupies the highest positions relative to other leaders within the same organization. Moreover, the demands placed on the executive leader, derived from both internal and external sources as a function of the responsibility and accountability of that leader, create a distinct set of constraints, limitations and requirements that distinguish the executive leader from others in their organization. This definition can be extrapolated to conditions of both peace and war as well. Although some may con-

tend that strategic and executive leadership in a wartime situation is distinct from peacetime, the definition presented here contends the opposite.¹⁴ Certain parallel requirements exist between the two that facilitate drawing broad conclusions to both understand the strategic leadership function and the development of individuals that can effectively operate in both conditions.¹⁵

As a derivative of this definition, the associated strategic function begins to emerge. Unlike leaders at lower levels, the strategic leader is concerned with both the internal organizational environment and the external context in which the organization operates. This distinction in their area of operations

has considerable impact on those tasks and duties that must be performed by the strategic leader. As a function of this overall obligation, executive leaders must first be able to effectively assess the external environment to determine the relevant social, economic and political trends that can impact upon the organization's ability to successfully deliver its product. Assessment of outside trends is designed primarily to develop new policy formulations that reflect changes which occur in the external environment. Responsiveness is therefore a fundamental requirement in synthesizing the influence of a variety of broad, divergent trends. But, responsiveness is not limited to the acquisition of relevant external information. Executive leaders must also respond to their analysis so that they may align the internal structures of their organizations, in a manner that is consistent with those external trends, so that they may continue to deliver their product effectively.

This responsibility, for which the strategic leadership of an organization is tasked, results from the organizing process itself. Organizations exist as the realization of the individual's will to bond together to co-ordinate activities in a collective effort to achieve a common purpose.¹⁶ The strategic leader, as a function of having responsibility for the entire organization, is charged with ensuring the continued vitality of the organization. The strategic leader's coordination of the organization's collective effort is facilitated by internal communication channels. But, these communications cannot be composed of an ad hoc bombardment of information; they must be constructed so that they are capable of fostering the interpersonal co-operation around which an organization is built, and which provide the collective purpose for which the organization exists. Therefore the leader's intent and purpose must be an integral part of these co-ordination efforts. Interjection of meaning is accomplished through a clearly enunciated and articulated strategic vision.

A vision is simply an image of a possible, credible, attractive and desirable future state for the organization.¹⁷ Vision however is more than a conceptual bridge to a future state. In seeking

to develop this image of the future, strategic leaders attempt to utilize the full potential of the organization by providing the direction their followers need.¹⁸ Additionally, the performance of the strategic leader's subordinates, upon which the organization's fortunes rest, can be enhanced by the considerable motivational benefits derived from a clear, concise and achievable vision.

When the organization has a clear sense of its purpose, direction, and desired future state and when this image is widely shared, individuals are able to find their own roles both in the organization and in the larger society of which they are a part. This empowers individuals.... (Thus) it is much more likely that they will bring vigour and enthusiasm to their tasks and that the results of their work will be mutually reinforcing. Under these conditions, the human energies of the organization are aligned toward a common end, and a major precondition for success has been satisfied.¹⁹

It is through vision that a strategic leader provides motivational impetus for followers to act upon. The attention focused on a vision appeals to those emotions by which followers reinforce the organization's values, ethics, and aspirations.²⁰ Concurrently, at a macro level, vision is an element that is a critical component of organizational culture. As a result, a renewed vision enables the strategic leader to create, revise or reaffirm the culture of the organization in an effort to either impart change or positively reinforce existing values.²¹ Moreover, a strategic leader can use the ideals of the vision to provide the imperative by which positive or potentially radical change can be initiated or organizational consensus, among the various constituencies, can be built. Thus, vision assists in the shaping of organizational culture, through the contribution of purpose, direction, energy, identity and values.

Although a seemingly simple proposition, an effective vision is frequently absent from failing organizations.²² Fracture is frequently the result of the ascendance of considerable uncertainty and complexity that produces an over-

abundance of conflicting images, which are distracting to the strategic leader's followers. This effect is compounded within larger organizations where a greater number of images, derived from multiple sources, act to increase the complexity of interaction within an organization and confuse the primary vision of the strategic leadership.²³ Vision is also often constrained by the strategic leader's fear of adjustment. Change is not always comfortable for those involved; the emotive dissonance that can be caused by rapid adjustment often has a severe negative impact on all levels of an organization. Vision associated with such change is correspondingly limited by a collective reluctance to accept it. Executive leaders, "instead of mobilizing their constituents to face tough, frustrating challenges,... are asked to protect those constituents from having to make adjustments."²⁴ A vision that directs an organization to a radically different future state can therefore be undercut due to a fear of the ramifications involved. But, failure to adopt a particular vision is not only constrained by fear. It can also be inhibited by the operational dynamic present within an organization. Institutional inertia, perpetuated by executives strongly influenced by the implicit beliefs, assumptions and values that underline a current strategic posture, are not easily dislodged.²⁵ A vision that challenges these stalwart characteristics is not always guaranteed successful implementation, thereby preventing the organization from reaping the positive motivational benefits of an effective vision.

In order to stem the tide of organizational myopia from gripping an institution, it is imperative that executive leadership present a clear and realistic vision to guide and motivate the actions of the collective. But, growing that vision presents its own unique challenges since the executive leader must be able to effectively synthesize the large amounts of information that impact the organization from both external and internal realms. Deciphering this multitude of stimuli, interpreting it, and integrating it into coherent organizational strategy is a fundamental challenge of executive leadership. The strategic task is indeed multi-functional: "... the strategic leader is embedded in ambiguity, complexity, and information overload..., (while at the

same time) the strategic leader has a complex integrative task...".²⁶ This places considerable strain on the executive leader as a function of the considerable responsibility that individual has in determining the appropriate course of action that will guarantee the internal and external utility of the organization.

Focus must therefore be placed on the executive leader's decision-making process. In particular, the factors that lead to strategic choice must be considered. It is important to note that complex decisions are largely the outcome of cognitive and behavioural factors, rather than the rational optimization of a typical cost-benefit analysis.²⁷ This has significant ramifications. Due to the cognitive and behavioural components, the individual characteristics of the decision-maker become the primary consideration, i.e. the cognitive and value bases possessed by that individual. The cognitive base has been hypothesised to contain three elements: knowledge or assumptions about future events, knowledge of alternatives, and knowledge of consequences attached to each alternative.²⁸ No one individual can possibly have a complete understanding of each of these components. Fluidity and complexity preclude this from ever occurring. Exacerbating this effect, the executive leader, based on individual value systems, may further filter relevant external or internal information, thereby further reducing the decision-maker's understanding of the situation. The process by which the decision-maker then integrates the numerous stimuli, in light of the perceptual filter, and eventually reaches a strategic decision, is summarized in Figure 1.²⁹

In developing this model of strategic choice, individual characteristics that serve to impact upon processes within the model must be understood so that personal development can take place that will reduce the effect of perceptual limitations. To accomplish this, we must first identify the relevant knowledge base and behavioural skills that strategic leaders must possess to be effective. Although drawing a distinction between the two

unnecessarily separates elements that act in concert, and is an inaccurate representation of the holistic requirement of strategic leadership, for exploratory purposes the essential attributes of the strategic leader can be broken down into two broad categories: knowledge and action skills. Knowledge skills involve "...understanding the present state (of the organization) and visualizing a successful future end state. These tasks demand leaders who possess high levels of cognitive complexity."³⁰ Cognitive complexity, as a concept, encapsulates a broad range of competencies that can be further broken down into two interdependent categories: frame of reference development, and systems understanding. Frame of reference development refers to the creation of complex mental maps that act as an individual's basis for observation and judgement. It is through these templates that unknown or complex stimuli can be ordered, within an individual's mind, so that meaning can be constructed out of environmental chaos.³¹ These frames develop as leaders progress through an organization. This experience imparts both wisdom and knowledge, at each organizational level, thereby giving the individual the opportunity to appreciate the organizational dynamic at each level of the organization. It is important to note that exposure does not guarantee mastery. Only individual initiative and institutionalized developmental forethought can offer that. Understanding emerges as a function of both the experience involved in operating at a variety of

organizational levels, as well as the formal study of the dominant dynamics that function within the organization's internal and external spheres. By of understanding the complex systems that act in the internal and external environments, the individual is able to produce the required meaning from the ordered stimuli.³² It is through understanding that the strategic leader visualizes the interactive dynamics of the total system, enabling effective decision-making, because of an appreciation for interdependencies within the entire system.

As can be seen from this rudimentary overview of strategic cognitive requirements, the intent of each category is to enable an individual to overcome those problems inherent within a model of bounded rationality, given that those issues mentioned earlier are not insurmountable. Each of these cognitive attributes enables the strategic leader to construct meaning out of the barrage of incoming information. It can therefore be assumed that individuals developed to supersede the limitations present within the bounded rationality model will become more effective strategic leaders because they are able to cope with the complexity and fluidity of that position. Thus, the individual's strategic leadership potential is highly related to and ultimately incumbent upon their cognitive ability.

The second broad series of skills, the action sets, have been described as force




Figure 1 - Strategic Choice Under Conditions of Bounded Rationality

of will (or similar terms) in the past. Many, such as Field Marshall Sir William Slim, have identified force of will as a vital component of the strategic leader. "Not only does the commander have to decide what is going to be done – that is perhaps one of the easier things – but he has got to see that it is done."³³ For the purposes of this paper, attributes such as this will be referred to as behavioural complexity. The thrust of this concept lies in the ability of the executive leader to "...execute a complex strategy by playing multiple, even competing roles in a highly integrated and complementary way."³⁴ These roles can include mentor, facilitator, innovator, producer and director. Each of these roles is necessary for the executive leader to see their strategic obligations fulfilled. But, it is not useful to list a series of general roles performed at the strategic level since the entirety of behavioural complexity is not explored. To this end, this concept can be broken down into two essential interpersonal skills that are prerequisites for effective strategic functioning: consensus-building, and communication. Strategic leaders are required to create consensus as a means of overcoming potential obstacles that can inhibit the direction they have adopted. This is particularly significant since the co-ordination of divergent constituencies is so pivotal to organizational performance.³⁵ The process by which consensus is built involves a combination of both the rational and emotional. Each serves to persuade or gain the commitment of those that may attempt to counteract the chosen direction or long-term goals that are being pursued. But, inherent within the construction of that consensus, as well as other tasks, is effective


communications. Transmitted through a variety of channels, the messages that emit from the strategic leader must have clarity of thought, direction, consistency and process.³⁶ These characteristics of strategic communication are crucial, so that the high degree of persuasiveness that is necessary when interacting with external and internal forces are present.

Hinted at throughout this description is this, that the dominant undercurrent linking each of these behavioural attributes is organizational success. It is of very little utility to have a leader who is able to integrate considerable quantities of information to form an effective vision and strategy but is unable to persuade or compel the organization to adopt it because of their inability to inspire their followers with effective interpersonal skills. Therefore, behavioural complexity seeks to enable the strategic leader to perform the numerous interpersonal roles required to effectively motivate and guide their subordinates to achieve the desired end-state of the organization. As with cognitive complexity, those with a higher degree of behavioural complexity are able to perform these series of tasks more effectively than those rated at a lower level. This is a function of their ability to align the motivation strategy, through personal flexibility, with the expectations, experiences, and personalities of their subordinates. "Again, the higher the commander's behavioural complexity, the higher the chance of successfully directing, pushing and harmonizing groups of often fundamentally different individuals towards a common goal."³⁷

Thus far, emphasis has been placed only on individual attributes that are important in the strategic leadership equation. This is unfortunately a misrepresentation of a single individual's impact. Other internal or external forces can affect an organization's strategic leadership, retarding an individual's ability to

"The strategic leader . . . is charged with ensuring the continued vitality of the organization."

articulate an effective vision and to see that future state achieved. External constraints can be derived from powerful stakeholders positioned outside the organization that have a vested interest in its performance. These groups typically dictate the conditions under which the organization operates so that they may shape the organization's products, processes, and policies in a manner consistent with their agenda.³⁸ Other sources of external constraint are political and legal limitations imposed on the organization. Restrictions imposed from these sources can limit the discretion of a strategic leader in choosing a new vision, thereby courting perceptions of ineptitude and incompetence. Similarly, those internal constraints that affect the strategic leader include powerful coalitions that align themselves against the chosen direction. Executive discretion is particularly limited when those factions have sufficient power to block implementation of the leader's vision.³⁹ Likewise, other blocking forces reside in the organizational culture and behaviour of the organization itself. Strong patterns of behaviour and an entrenched organizational culture combine to produce institutional inertia that can undermine any efforts at change, particularly in large organizations that operate with entrenched value systems or operational processes. "People resist change that threatens their status and power, contradicts their values and beliefs, or requires learning new ways to do things."⁴⁰ These individual constraints interact with each other and with the characteristics of the strategic leader to influence that leader's performance. The strength of the constraints and the execu-



tive leader's attributes are therefore positively related to the overall performance of the strategic leader. But, other methods can be utilized, such as executive teams, which allow the strategic leadership to create a more favourable equation. These tools encourage 'buying into' the vision being promulgated, thereby creating consensus, understanding and commitment among the divergent constituencies that influence organizational performance.⁴¹ But there is no guarantee that executive teams work. "It is more difficult to develop mutual trust and co-operation when team members represent diverse sub-units with different objectives and cultures, when there is intense competition among sub-units for scarce resources or when there is sharp competition to become the successor to the current CEO."⁴² It is therefore incumbent on the strategic leadership to be conscious of these constraints and to ensure that their effects do not unduly hamper the organization. By reducing the impact of these constraints executive leaders are then better able to implement their vision for improved organizational performance.

History validates that these skills embody the essence of strategic leadership. But, the existence of historical precedent does not mean that individuals in the past were any more predisposed to learn from history's lessons than we are today. Although each element is seemingly grounded in common sense, history is littered with examples of strategic leaders who possessed or employed those components of strategic leadership with varying degrees of effectiveness and success. In particular, the conduct of Adolf Hitler throughout the Second World War, despite some exceptions, dramatically portrayed the pitfalls associated with possessing a limited perspective. In numerous instances, he was blinded by both his strategic vision and force of will in a manner that distorted the strategic choice he forced upon his military commanders.

Indeed, Hitler's disposition of his now seriously diminished resources and his choice of objectives were increasingly determined by wilfulness and volatility of mood...; as the Fuhrer's difficulties mounted, his designs became more grandiose and unrealistic; and he became ever more irrational in his reaction

to setbacks, squandering resources out of obstinate blindness to facts or for reasons of prestige... The war now attained the ultimate in irrationality, with Germany's commanding generals reduced, as one of them said, to the status of 'highly paid NCOs' and the Fuhrer giving the orders in every sector of every front and insisting that willpower was enough to triumph over superior numbers and equipment.⁴³

Contrast this obvious failure of strategic leadership with two examples of successful applications of the strategic imperative.

*We few, we happy few, we band of brothers.
For he today who sheds his blood with me
shall be my brother; be he ne're so vile
This day shall gentle his countenance
And gentlemen in England now abed
shall think themselves accursed they were not here
and hold their manhoods cheap while any speak
who fought with us upon Saint Crispin's day.*

Henry V's oration at Agincourt, although a fictional retelling of actual events, casts a different picture of strategic leadership. Henry conveyed his expectations and vision to his soldiers in a clear manner that resonated with them because it included values they would respond to.⁴⁴ Moreover, he had the force of will and personal conviction to see his vision to fruition through an effective combination of assessment, planning, communication and willingness to act.⁴⁵ A more modern example can be found in Winston Churchill. His actions throughout the Second World War exemplified leadership at a strategic level:

Churchill's qualities of leadership were not, of course, confined to boldness in proposing action and taking decisions. It was the way he worked which won admiration, even devotion, from people of all sorts. His sheer presence inspired, his capacity for work was astonishing, yet he was intensely human, making his staff feel that they were all part of a great team.⁴⁶

Churchill's ability to articulate an eloquent strategic vision is telling of his abilities as a strategic leader. To formu-

late that vision, he had to possess both the cognitive and behavioural complexity skills of an effective strategic leader. Both were required to make a strategic leader effective, and examples are readily available that highlight how Churchill displayed each in order to achieve his ultimate vision in the Second World War.

It is all well and good to identify the attributes necessary for a strategic leader to limit the effects of perceptual pitfalls associated with models of bounded rationality, but an awareness of the actual process in which cognitive and behavioural complexity can be developed, so that individuals can perform strategic tasks, is paramount. Some general points have emerged regarding strategic leadership development. Firstly, intensive and extensive effort, on the part of the individual and the organization, is required.⁴⁷ Thus, certain compromises must be made during a typical career path in order to allow for the necessary development to occur. In this vein, successful development occurs as a result of systematic effort. That is, strategic development should be a component of the organization's management cycle and must be acknowledged, by the individual, as an essential component of their development.⁴⁸ Incentives for personal development are also essential. Learning must be linked to tangible returns or it will not occur. Finally, all learning and experience must occur in the proper context. Both must be framed in the organization's core functions so that the required knowledge and experience is internalized.

From these broad themes, it is apparent that the time necessary to develop strategic leaders is obviously going to be considerable. This intuitive assessment has been validated through research. Short-term training programs do not impart the necessary cognitive and behavioural complexity required of executive leaders.⁴⁹ This is largely a function of the patterns of thought that develop during short-term courses. These thought processes are largely based on problems where the premises are supplied, problems are well bounded, options are generated and rated, and the optimum option is chosen.⁵⁰ While rationally sensible, this method fails because it does not instil the flexibility and adaptability

required of a strategic leader under considerable time pressure and with incomplete information. Conversely, those programs that have shown potential have been longer-term training strategies embodying the previously discussed characteristics. Successful programs also apply particular methodologies.

A brief overview of three types of exercise will highlight effective methodologies for training individuals to become strategic leaders. The first revolves around a critical thinking training strategy. Utilizing a series of tools (including task analysis, simulation, feedback, and performance measures) delivered via particular teaching methods (information and practice based) within the context of specific content (handling conflictual evidence, generating alternatives and time adjustments)⁵¹, the potential leader is better able to handle the complexity and fluidity associated with strategic level decision making. Moreover, the leader is better able to act under conditions of information overload. Research into the utility of this training strategy has validated these conclusions.⁵²

A second method of instilling the requisite skills of a strategic leader involves practical thinking. The problem solving exercises presented differ with this method as they are based on premises that are often implicit without being well bounded, they contain multiple solutions, and uncertainty is a constant.⁵³ A continual process of re-evaluation and redefinition of the problem, of potential solutions, and of associated consequences creates innovation as a result of blending critical thought with creativity.⁵⁴ Although contradictory at times, these two impulses are allowed to complement each other in the leader's thought process, thus empowering that individual with an adaptive cognitive base that is receptive to changes in situational context, knowledge and information, or institutional or social values. Another useful development tool involves harnessing the ability of an individual to understand the essence of a particular problem. Situational assessment exercises utilize higher order cognitive functions to train the individual's thought process in a specific manner. Instead of relying upon instinctual thought processes, the individual is trained to consciously review and assess that process.⁵⁵ The aim of this review is to detect

the presence of normal human biases, emotions, and predispositions that can obstruct the decision making process. A recognition that their limited field of vision, selective perception and interpretation can individually or collectively adversely affect their decision-making capabilities can facilitate a change in the thought patterns that breed these process characteristics in the first place, thereby provoking a widening of those perceptions.

Although the propositions presented here rely heavily on the civilian experience, consistency between that realm and the military is evident in the development of strategic leaders. No matter what realm the individual is operating in, the requirement to possess the broadest range of

"Short-term training programs do not impart the necessary cognitive and behavioural complexity required of executive leaders."

intellectual and personal qualities is paramount. For instance, there is no differentiation between the civilian and military requirement for training cognitive skills: "...the Army should place a high priority on leadership that is intellectually stimulating and on selection and training of cognitive skills promoting innovative thinking."⁵⁶ To accomplish this the military must utilize those systems that produce similarly equipped civilian leaders. A prime example of civilian training which would greatly benefit military executive leaders is civilian postgraduate education. It is possible, within this environment, to considerably broaden the horizons of the military strategic leader. "In such an environment, the officer is better able to evaluate the military institution – and the political system itself. Social issues, human behaviour, morality and philosophy are now a part of discussion. Alternative sources of information and influence are available, resulting in a greater dynamism..."⁵⁷ The military component of the strategic imperative will not be adversely affected by this civilian education, rather it will be enhanced through widening the military leader's perspective. Some may contend that an emphasis on this type of

training neglects the ultimately essential military component, but this need not be the case. Computer aided training has supplanted traditional barriers to training leaders in strategic level military operations, thereby allowing an individual to be effectively trained in the military component as well.⁵⁸ It should be made clear however, that the requirement for military strategic leaders to possess considerable background in 'civilian' affairs cannot be divorced from military responsibilities. The military dynamic is highly dependent upon civilian political, social, and economic systems: "...the tasks (the strategic leader) may have to perform emphasize professional competence on an infinitely broader scale. The mature professional's contribution to the nation is more in his understanding of the nature of military force and its utility and application in the overall domestic and international environments."⁵⁹ To this end, military executives must possess sufficient understanding of the internal and external environments in which their organization operates. Specifically, strategic military leaders must understand the political, social and economic dynamics of larger society.⁶⁰ Furthermore, they must have an appreciation of the nuances associated with civil-military relations. Only by understanding the involvement of civil authorities in military affairs can the executive leader appreciate the processes that can instigate the greatest impact upon their organization. This holds true for all aspects of the military executive's interaction with civilian authorities.

Strategic leadership, as a distinct leadership requirement, is a fundamental prerequisite of organizational effectiveness. Without it, the efforts of leaders and subordinates at lower levels will be left unguided and unprotected from the internal and external dynamics that impact upon those individuals. Only an executive level leader is empowered within the organization to interact effectively with the external environment and provide the necessary internal direction to align the institution to meet future challenges. It is therefore the responsibility of strategic leaders to articulate a clear, desirable and achievable vision, based on the impulses of the external world, and ensure that the organization adopts and

follows through on that direction. Due to its obvious importance, strategic level leaders are required to be highly competent individuals. Their development must be planned meticulously in order to instill the appropriate cognitive and behavioural skills; the development of strategic level leaders cannot be left to chance, which is often the case. The threat to organizational effectiveness is assumed in many institutions, even though it does not need

to be. This potential risk does not have to be accepted because the existence of development models, originating from a wide breadth of sources, highlight a direction that can be utilized to 'grow' strategic leaders. By first understanding the limitations associated with the strategic requirement, the development of cognitive and behavioural attributes that can expand the perceptual boundaries of a given executive leader will mitigate inter-

nal and external constraints. It is through these competencies that effective strategic leadership is built. Relying on any other source of divine leadership to emerge spontaneously within an organization is nothing less than an abdication of strategic responsibility.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Master-Corporal Richard P. Thorne is a Reservist with The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment in Kingston, Ontario. He holds a BA (Honours) from Queen's University in Political Studies and a Master of Arts in War Studies from The Royal Military College of Canada. He has completed work in International Relations and Leadership Theory, and is currently working for the Directorate of Army Training as a Research Assistant.

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ISTAR Sensor Integration: A Non-Melting Pot Option

by Captain Martin Rivard

An important element of manoeuvre warfare is the commander's capability to be cognisant of the battle space. Generals like Hannibal and Napoleon used foot patrols and cavalry for this task; these methods are still in use today. In more recent times, beyond visual range, methods have been used to acquire knowledge of enemy plan or positions. The code breaking of the Purple cryptologic machine by the U.S. Navy prior to the battle of Midway and the use of JSTAR during the Persian Gulf war are good examples. A concept to facilitate the processing of data and information provided by sensors has been introduced to the Canadian Forces - Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR). The role of ISTAR within the mechanized brigade-group is to provide the commander with the information required to gain battle space awareness

in the brigade area of interest and to deny this capability to the enemy. ISTAR is defined 'as a structure within which information collected through systematic observation is integrated with that collected from specific missions and processed in order to meet the Commander's intelligence requirements.'¹ A graphical representation of The *ISTAR Process* is shown in Figure 1:

The main issue being debated at this moment is the regrouping of *all* sensors within a single ISTAR unit. Included in this issue is the question of the nature of the brigade group armoured reconnaissance squadron: is this a manoeuvre element, or just another group of sensors? These issues can be resolved by the use of hypothesis testing. For this we will use techniques based on the χ^2 / goodness-of-fit test. By reformulating the problem in mathematical terms, we have:

H_0 = Regrouping sensor *k* has no impact on the commander's ability to fight in all types of operations under any conditions.

H_a = Regrouping sensor *k* impacts on the commander's ability to fight in all types of operations under any conditions.

If we accept H_a , we must consider that a negative impact rejects the regrouping of sensor *k* within the ISTAR unit. In those cases where we accept H_0 , we can either regroup, or keep the sensor as a distinct entity in its parent organization. We will define and compare every sensor/sub-element of ISTAR to H_0 to verify this goodness-of-fit.

INTELLIGENCE

'The mission of ... intelligence is to provide timely, relevant, accurate, and synchronised ... support to tactical, operational, and strategic commanders across the range of military operations.'² Intelligence is the beginning and the end of the battle space analysis cycle; starting with intelligence preparation of the battlefield and ending with the assessment of battle damage. The nature of modern manoeuvre warfare requires an intelligence function that is more flexible and has more analysis horsepower than before.

At the present time, it is primarily the G2 staff of the brigade-group HQ that accomplishes




Figure 1 - The ISTAR Process

this. By regrouping most staff found in the G2 cell with the Intercept and Analysis section of the Electronic Warfare (EW) troop, the commander would have a more powerful intelligence organization. It would get improved access to national intelligence assets like imagery and to national Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) assets. The economies of scale caused by regrouping the analysts of both organizations would improve both the quantity and quality of intelligence given to the commander. Does this affect the brigade-group intelligence assets in the accomplishment of other tasks? It does not; as we are combining separate assets that are accomplishing the same tasks. This combination of intelligence oriented assets is occurring at the national level with success, thus the same results should be possible with tactical assets.

SURVEILLANCE

Battlefield surveillance is defined as 'systematic observation of the battle area for the purpose of providing timely information and combat intelligence.'³ In modern warfare, a commander will not limit surveillance to the immediate battlefield if enemy weaknesses are to be found and exploited. To look and listen in the enemy's rear requires specialized assets that are usually not under tactical command, such as spaceborne or airborne assets, and SIGINT assets. The

commander may be provided, however, with tactical SIGINT elements appropriate to the mission.

Surveillance assets are usually not regrouped into one organization. While tactical SIGINT resources generally fall under the umbrella of land forces, airborne assets like drones/unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), photo-reconnaissance aircraft and satellites tend to be controlled by air forces. To access surveillance assets, a commander must deal with multiple organizations, slowing down our decision-action cycle in respect to the enemy's. Consider for example the UAV: with modern technologies, these can be readily and easily available to land force commanders all the way down to the battle group. Even though we are considering UAVs as surveillance assets; they can also be used as sensors for target acquisition and reconnaissance. They can also be used as airborne electronic support and attack platforms, and automated radio rebroadcast platforms. By regrouping UAV with the ISTAR unit, we are giving the commander direct access to all these capabilities, improving information gathering capability over the battle area and beyond it. This would impact the commander's ability to fight by providing better information faster, thus reducing the decision-action cycle without risking manoeuvre elements and other resources. Photo-reconnaissance aircraft and satellites are a different issue.

These assets are too low in number to be provided under command of a land force commander lower than army group, who will usually be given a certain number of sorties or passes in a given period of time. Even though regrouping control of photo-reconnaissance aircraft and satellites under the ISTAR unit would positively impact the commander's ability to fight, it is not economical to do so. In this case, the ISTAR unit is the access point for these assets, using the multiple communications links shown in Figure 1.⁴

TARGET ACQUISITION

Target acquisition is defined as 'the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them'⁵, the appropriate response being either physical destruction or an electronic attack (EA). The dynamic nature of target acquisition, as a continuous process, has made it an all-arms responsibility co-ordinated at the highest level. Figure 2 shows the basic inner workings of the Target Acquisition Process. The targeting process also supports collection activities by providing steerage to ISTAR after the establishment of required target accuracy. ISTAR sensors are also utilized for battle damage assessment.

As mentioned target acquisition is an all-arms responsibility involving SIG-




Figure 2 - The Target Acquisition Process




Figure 3 - ISTAR Troop Organization Model

INT elements, UAVs and observers, i.e. the Forward Observation Officer (FOO) and Forward Air Controller (FAC). Would regrouping FOOs and FACs with the ISTAR unit modify the commander's ability to fight? FOOs and FACs are usually used to direct fire on established targets or targets of opportunity, and they are normally deployed well forward of other sensors. Regrouping them with ISTAR would most probably not directly affect the commander's ability to fight. On the other hand, FOOs and FACs might lose their integration with the weapons systems they control or the combat arms units they support, and this would affect the commander's ability to fight. For this reason, these sensors should remain organic to the weapons systems units. If we take the same approach for the controlling elements of the targeting process, e.g., the Fire Support Control Centre (FSCC), we arrive at the same conclusion: regrouping the FSCC would have a negative impact on the commander's ability to fight. Regardless of maintaining the status quo, the nature of modern land warfare requires a very high level of interaction between collecting assets and the core element of the targeting team. This level can be achieved by data links between the ISTAR CP and the FSCC, or by co-locating the two entities.

RECONNAISSANCE

Reconnaissance is any activity undertaken to obtain by visual observation or other detection methods, information about activities and

resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area.⁶ Reconnaissance assets are normally integral to manoeuvre units, in the form of reconnaissance troops/platoons, and to formations, in the form of armoured reconnaissance squadrons or regiments.

Reconnaissance is generally conducted late in the battle space analysis process, since reconnaissance assets usually observe the enemy right before they come in contact with forward elements of the main force. Advances in radar technologies now permit reconnaissance elements of the brigade-group to acquire the enemy beyond visual range.

Within the brigade-group and manoeuvre units, it is important to note that reconnaissance elements have tasks other than reconnaissance. These other tasks should be considered when examining whether regrouping the armoured reconnaissance squadron with the ISTAR unit would impact the commander's ability to fight. At first glance the impact would probably not be enough for us to accept the alternative hypothesis, but if we take a closer look at the tasks performed by the armoured reconnaissance squadron, we find that it is more manoeuvre element than sensor. In defensive operations, it will form part or all off the brigade screen, form a guard if reinforced, and conduct flank security. While the task of brigade screen can be considered a dedicated ISTAR role for

the armoured reconnaissance squadron, other tasks are more in the nature of a manoeuvre element. In offensive operations, the squadron is more an ISTAR asset than manoeuvre unit due to its role in fulfilling the commander's battle space information requirements, particularly given the nature of modern warfare that makes rapid updating of information critical to the maintenance of tempo. Some discussions have promoted the regrouping of the armoured reconnaissance squadron with all other ISTAR assets of the brigade-group. Unlike most ISTAR elements, the armoured reconnaissance squadron accomplishes tasks other than ISTAR tasks. By regrouping the armoured reconnaissance squadron, we run the risk of losing the capability to accomplish those other tasks without increasing the field commander's battle space awareness above the present levels.

ORGANIZATION

An organization model for the ISTAR unit can easily be extracted from the 20 CMBG Electronic Warfare Troop organization⁷. In this model, shown in the Figure 3 - ISTAR Troop Organization Model, the Intercept and Analysis Section would be bigger since it would be augmented with Intelligence Operators from the G2 staff as described earlier. Included in the troop headquarters is an Electronic Warfare Liaison Officer (EWLO) section of two to three EWLO teams. The role of the EWLO is to coordinate ISTAR efforts with flanking and superior formations. These teams are equipped with the communications

means to fuse the information acquired by all and retransmit it to the commander. Y Section, which includes Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), would not be changed. ESM includes communications/radar emitters direction finding, while ECM contains radio frequency jammers, and also controls the use of disposable jammers (ESM and ECM systems can be either land based or airborne). Added to the EW Troop organization is the UAV/Drones section. The number of detachments depend on the type of UAV used.⁸

Even though the 20 CMBG organization is a wartime model; this ISTAR Troop model can be fielded as shown in peacetime with existing resources. The unit would need to be augmented with personnel and equipment from national assets and the reserve for certain domestic and international operations in peacetime. How should this ISTAR Troop be integrated in the brigade-group? Options have been suggested by different proponents, such as attaching the troop to the armoured reconnaissance squadron or to the headquarters and signals squadron. If we should not integrate armoured reconnaissance into ISTAR, then we should not integrate

ISTAR into it. Although integrating the ISTAR Troop in the headquarters and signals squadron seems to make sense at first, it is not a viable solution. The operations of the ISTAR troop are different from, if not the opposite of, those of the headquarters and signals squadron. The goal of the headquarters and signals squadron is to maintain communications within the formation, whereas ISTAR is designed to obtain information from the radio frequency spectrum and possibly disrupt enemy emitters. In garrison, ISTAR requires specialized facilities with levels of physical security far higher than other units for static operations, training and maintenance.

CONCLUSION

No organizational or doctrinal model is perfect, but this paper has demonstrated that the regrouping of most ISTAR assets into a single unit either maintains the commander's ability to fight in all types of operations under any conditions, or enhances it by improving battle space awareness. Regrouping certain assets into functional groupings within such a unit is also required to maximize the resources provided to the brigade-group. Building a

carbon copy of the American Military Intelligence battalion would not be as efficient. Even though the ISTAR model can find its roots in the US Army model, we must ensure that the final organization model reflects our needs and resources. It is important to note that this model does not absorb any resources integral to the battle groups, like reconnaissance troops/platoons. The ISTAR troop should be seen more as a general support type of unit than close support.

Certain individuals will oppose such an organization for fear of having their trades amalgamated with others. By fighting over 'badges' we would do a disservice not only to the field commander, but also to our personnel and the Canadian Forces in general. We must remember that to support the commander's goals, ISTAR is being developed to integrate all the elements that will make understanding the battle space faster, more precise, and easier. It is critical that we all work together, signallers, gunners, tankers and 'ints', to give the commander the best battlefield awareness possible.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Captain Martin Rivard holds a bachelor's degree in Economics from *Université de Sherbrooke*. He joined the Communications Reserve in 1993, and has served as troop commander with 714 and 712 Communication Squadrons. He is now Staff Officer Electronic Warfare with the Canadian Forces Information Operations Group Headquarters in Ottawa.

ENDNOTES

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2. FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*.

3. AAP-6, *NATO Glossary*.

4. For certain of these resources; photo-reconnaissance aircraft, airborne SIGINT platforms, and satellites; authority from a Lieutenant General or equivalent is required to assign a platform to a request.

5. B-GL-300-001/FP-001, *Firepower*.

6. AAP-6, *NATO Glossary*.

7. ITC 1 study package.

8. There is presently a multitude of UAV available, ranging from small remotely piloted planes to large self-guided vehicles like the USAF Global Hawk. Cost and size of the UAV are the major factors in determining the number of UAV detachments in the UAV/Drones section. Within the next couple of years, UAV the size of small model airplanes with the same capabilities as larger drones will become available. The UAV/Drones section could also include unmanned land vehicles and automatic observation posts.

"Global Mobile": Flexible Response, Peacekeeping and the Origins of Forces Mobile Command, 1958-1964

by Sean M. Maloney, PhD

Although peace-keeping is a fundamentally different occupation to the countering of subversion, there is a surprising similarity in the outward forms of many of the techniques involved. . . . It is also important that those involved in countering subversion should realize that they are involved in this activity and not peace-keeping. It is not difficult to become confused in this respect.

Frank Kitson,
*Low Intensity Operations*¹

This is the first part of a two-part series dealing with the origins and early history of Mobile Command. The second part, entitled " 'Global Mobile' II: The Development of Forces Mobile Command, 1965-1970," will appear in a future issue of the Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin.

INTRODUCTION

Canadian operations in Egypt and in the Congo in the late 1950s and early 1960s highlighted serious deficiencies in Canada's approach to United Nations peace operations: Canada's military forces were not structured, trained, or equipped to carry out protracted peace operations in the UN context. It was all very well for a government to develop peace operations policy; it was something quite different to be able to implement it both quickly and effectively.

Peace observation missions were conducted by individual Canadian soldiers, sailors and airmen seconded to those bodies responsible for the operations. They carried their own personal kit and were integrated into international teams living off the economy of the regions in which they were



Lieutenant-General "Fin" Clark, Chief of the General Staff, 1958 to 1961. Clark became the youngest major-general ever in the Canadian Army when he was promoted to that rank in 1949 at age 40. Clark oversaw the development of the "Standby Force". (Canadian Forces Photo Unit)

deployed. United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was the first example of formed Canadian units deploying on UN missions, but those units were ad hoc composite ones squeezed out of the Canadian Army and RCAF's existing force structure. The question was, could or should Canada multi-task its armed forces to handle both NATO hot war and peripheral area Cold War tasks?

NATO military and political leaders were attempting to understand the role of low intensity conflict within the NATO Area itself and such a conflict's relationship to conventional and nuclear war. The focal point was now

the crisis over the city of Berlin, which had implications for NATO activities on the peripheries. "Flank O' Mania" surged onto the scene, a trend which influenced Canada's attempts to create a military force structure that could conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict. Problems in force structure and application from 1960 to 1963 laid the groundwork for more radical peacekeeping concepts implemented by the Pearson government after 1963 and further blurred the distinction between NATO and UN interests in the Canadian context.

PROTO-FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, BRUSHFIRE WARS AND PEACEKEEPING: 1958-1962

The adoption of the Canadian UN Standby Battalion concept in 1958 appears to be the first concrete step taken by the armed services towards accepting that a permanent peace operations capability would exist as part of Canada's force structure. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld had, throughout early 1957 and in the wake of the Suez Crisis, "steadily developed the idea of an active role for the United Nations through practical demonstrations of what the organization could do." In particular, Hammarskjöld was drawn to the idea of using the UN proactively as a preventative diplomatic tool, to cut international crises off at the pass and, if necessary, deploying existing "standby" peacekeeping forces to stamp out the brushfires. In the Secretary General's view, the best nations to carry this out were "middle powers"—Ireland, Norway, Tunisia, The Netherlands and Canada—coupled with "Great Power" support. It was essentially a refined and more systematic approach than that which had started back in the late 1940s.² These ideas were known within

the UN community and were known to Canadian national security policymakers in 1957.³

The Diefenbaker government's response was to take a December 1956 External Affairs study on establishing a permanent on-call multi-national UN Emergency Force and make it policy. The Government announced in early 1958 that a Canadian UN Standby Force had been formed. It would take the Canadian Army another three years to actually work out how such a force would deploy and actually carry out its ambiguous task, something left rather vague. It was not clear whether an entire brigade or a battalion group should be dedicated to the UN. The fact that the Canadian Army was already fully committed to its NATO and home defence tasks was not taken into account. What really mattered to the Diefenbaker government was the announcement of the establishment of the force. The details or its modus operandi were of secondary importance.⁴

Throughout 1959, the Army sorted out how it would meet the government-directed UN Standby Force commitment. Lieutenant General "Fin" Clark, the Chief of the General Staff, was operating in a vacuum. Even General Charles Foulkes, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, could not get more explicit political guidance on the size of the commitment or what it was supposed to be able to do. This despite the fact that Minister of National Defence George Pearkes told the Air Staff that Canada would be called on more and more to contribute to "peace preserving teams to prevent the outbreak of war in many parts of the world."⁵ Therefore, the original idea that Canada's UN Standby Force would be a light infantry brigade with a reconnaissance squadron was discarded. Consequently, Army planners developed a number of assumptions: the Standby Force would be an infantry battalion or company; it was to be air transported by the RCAF and its role was to "carry out police-type duties" in a UNEF context; its training would consist of normal infantry training; the unit was to be kept at 90% strength and be deployable in seven days.⁶

Previous crisis responses, including Operation RAPID STEP (the deployment of UNEF to Suez) in 1956, were all ad hoc affairs. There was no peace operations doctrine. From 1958 forward, a great deal of effort would be spent by the Armed Forces on formalizing the new capability. This effort, however, did not occur in a Canadian vacuum. It was part and parcel of larger trends in NATO circles relating to revolutionary warfare.

Military theorists of the day recognized that Communist-inspired revolutionary warfare existed long before the Cold War started in 1946, but the term came into its own throughout the 1950s as the French and British armies fought their de-colonization campaigns. Like the term "peacekeeping," the West's response to revolutionary warfare had a myriad of terms that helped obfuscate doctrinal matters. "Counter-revolutionary warfare," "counter-insurgency" and "low intensity warfare" are some of those terms.

Revolutionary warfare, in essence, included some or all of the following activities: political subversion, black propaganda and white propaganda, the supplying of arms and training by proxy, political assassination, sabotage, ambushes and small sub-unit activity. In short, revolutionary warfare consisted of any combination of methods, perhaps in conjunction with traditional military engagements between formed bodies of identifiable soldiers directed towards achieving political objectives. The process by which Western armies identified and responded to this type of warfare was an arduous one and was in progress throughout the 1950s.⁷

Looking back, we can categorize Cold War conflict in the Third World in a number of ways. There were the long-term insurgencies in larger colonies like Algeria (1954-62). There were conflicts of smaller scale and shorter duration like Kenya (1952-55). There were crisis flashpoints like Suez (1956) and Lebanon (1958). Some had direct Communist support; others did not. At the time, however, such fine distinctions had not been made because Western theorists lacked the vocabulary and means to categorize them. They were



Lieutenant-General G. Walsh, Chief of the General Staff, 1961 to 1964, expressed concern regarding the impact of UN commitments on the Army. (Canadian Forces Photo Unit)

all lumped together and placed within the Cold War strategic framework.

NATO debated and accepted that revolutionary warfare techniques might in fact be applied against the NATO Area as well as the Third World: NATO strategic concept MC 14/2 (revised) recognized this in 1957. Thus, when the Berlin Crisis started in 1958-59, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Lauris Norstad had some agreed-to strategic basis from which to formulate a response to low-level Soviet military and political activity. This related to the larger problems of linking Western nuclear response to Soviet activity either inside or outside the NATO Area. NATO's strategy was ambiguous and deliberately so. The problem was, would or should NATO use nuclear weapons in response to a border incident involving Warsaw Pact and NATO forces? If the Soviets blockaded Berlin? If Soviet naval forces interfered with Norwegian sovereignty? If

Syrian forces crossed the Turkish border near Iskendrun? Employing a small conventional NATO force to contain such a situation was conceptually similar to the employment of UNEF at Suez, though the specifics of the method differed.⁸

“The problem was that there was a lack of strategic lift to get it there in a timely fashion and it was very expensive ...”

To forestall the necessity of selecting armageddon as the only response, Norstad formed a special contingency planning group called LIVE OAK in 1959. It was not a NATO organization: it was a tripartite French-British-American body strictly designed to deal with low level Soviet military activity related to Berlin. It used forces committed to NATO in West Germany by those three powers and was capable of providing a conventional Western military response from platoon to brigade in size. LIVE OAK allowed the West a flexible, graduated response and crisis management tool for situations in and around Berlin.⁹

Norstad initially wanted to reorganize the Canadian Army NATO commitment, 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, as an air-portable and air-mobile light infantry formation to handle what were referred to as “fire brigade tasks” throughout the Allied Command Europe area. He wanted a force that could “strengthen his deterrent power in the event of a border incident” since only a single nation force which “was not suspect by the Warsaw Pact peoples” could do the job. Conceptually, such a force would deploy to a border area to demonstrate NATO will and prevent escalation to nuclear weapons use over a minor incident involving the Warsaw Pact. This plan was not implemented for a variety of political reasons relating to French and British intransigence over NATO strategy.¹⁰

The principle of Forward Defence of the NATO Area took concrete form. This meant the Central Region was no longer viewed in isolation from the Northern Flank (Norway, Denmark) and the Southern Flank (Mediterranean). The Soviets might employ a diplomatic offensive combined with threatening gestures (exercises) and political subversion in attempts to isolate and wear down the political will of flank countries to resist. Norstad again looked to the Canadian NATO forces to provide a brigade-sized air-portable force that could rapidly deploy to the flanks when a crisis started to escalate in order to signal the Warsaw Pact or the United Arab Republic that NATO meant business. This force was supposed to be capable of dealing with low-level military activity as well as functioning as a deterrent manoeuvre. The Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force concept would become a reality in 1964, though it was multi-national in composition and not strictly Canadian.¹¹

LIVE OAK and ACE Mobile Force demonstrate that NATO was seriously engaged in examining military crisis management options that overlapped with peace operations and counter-insurgency. The fact that Canada was frequently and actively consulted on such activity and its similarity to the planning underway for Canada’s UN Standby force was critical in the development of Canadian conceptualization for low intensity operations.

This development accelerated when Douglas Harkness replaced George Pearkes as Minister of National Defence in 1960. That same year, General Charles Foulkes handed over the reins of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to Air Vice Marshal Frank Miller. A whirlwind series of Senate hearings in 1960 on defence expenditures forced the Diefenbaker government to articulate some of its more ambiguous defence policies. The Privy Council Office consulted with External Affairs and produced an analysis they called “The Defence Problem.” Though the bulk of the study dealt with NATO, disarmament and nuclear weapons, it also suggested that “limited wars may well occur around the peripheries of the Soviet and Western Blocs. . . . the provision of suitable standby forces in

Canada for such wars should be one of the objectives of Canadian policy.” The study went so far as to suggest that:

Indeed it may be that practically all branches of the Canadian forces may make their greatest contribution to the defence of the West and Canada if they concentrate on preparation for limited wars our forces should be trained and equipped to protect themselves against the effects of [nuclear weapons] for fear that limited wars in which they are engaged should spread and the great powers, using nuclear weapons, should intervene.¹²

The study argued that intervention forces, some of which might be naval forces, would eventually be needed in the Caribbean, Gaza Strip, and “elsewhere in the Middle East.” There was acknowledged overlap between peace operations and counter-insurgency since “the conventional forces needed as a standby in Canada for duties in limited wars should also be capable of performing police or inspection duties as non-combatants.”¹³ The anti-nuclear components of the study suggest strong External Affairs influence, a perspective which was not accepted by those in National Defence or the armed services. Nevertheless, Air Marshal Frank Miller passed it on to Douglas Harkness as a background paper. The limited war themes resonated in ongoing National Defence examinations of having a rapidly deployable force.

Canada’s rapid deployment force development was, however, driven less by post-Operation MALLARD (Canadian participation in the UN counter-insurgency and nation building operations in the Congo) analysis than by the Diefenbaker government’s prodding. The unwillingness of the Diefenbaker government to deploy the existing UN Standby Force infantry battalion to the Congo because Diefenbaker feared the effects of potentially placing white Canadians in the position of fighting and killing black Africans¹⁴ forced the Army to re-assess the standby force concept. In 1960, the Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant-General “Fin” Clark directed that a second standby force concept be

examined, one which would consist of administrative and signal troops as opposed to combat arms.

In the course of this study, several important factors became clear. First, “the nature and extent of any United Nations request for Canadian contribution cannot be anticipated in detail.” Second, the Canadian Army’s priority was NATO, followed by national survival operations and the defence of North America. There were simply not enough troops to cover all of the commitments and create a separate UN standby force. An existing unit would have to be “dual hatted” in the role. The problem of strategic lift was not examined in detail.¹⁵

An entirely separate study was needed to determine exactly what the force was to do. In general terms, the first time the Army actually defined peacekeeping operations was when the Director General for Planning and Operations commissioned an operational research study in 1961. The terms of reference generated by Army HQ indicated that the following missions were likely for “the Canadian Army in the UN Police Role”:

- supervisory organizations—the supervision of truce or other agreements;
- border-watching—the separation of forces and the identification of transgressors;
- occupation—the positioning of a force in a country to fill a political vacuum during an interregnum; the conduct of a plebiscite as was done in the Saar in 1936 by the League of Nations;
- suppression of a para-military force—an example of, and a precedent for, this type of task is the employment of Commonwealth forces in the independent state of Malaya; and
- limited war.¹⁶

Clearly peacekeeping meant more to the Canadian Army than just interpositional operations. Other supporting



Gazing into the future. Vice Admiral Rayner (Chief of the Naval Staff 1960 to 1964), Deputy Minister Elgin Strong, the Honourable Paul Hellyer (Minister of National Defence 1963 to 1967) and Rear-Admiral Brock (Flag Officer, Atlantic Coast) in Halifax, 1964. All had something to say about the future of warfare and force structure. (Canadian Forces Photo Unit)

studies amplified the idea that peacekeeping was not just Kashmir or Suez: “maintaining internal order” also appeared alongside “policing a demarcation line.”¹⁷

The Strategic Studies Group (SSG) was commissioned by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to study UN military operations in March 1961. In its report, the SSG noted that “The term ‘UN Police Force’ has been applied indiscriminately to all three types of forces”: observer commissions, UNEFs in Egypt and the Congo, and those forces operating in the Korean War. This tended to blur the political objectives of each mission. Observer missions and the Suez operation were more straight forward than the UN operation in the Congo (*Operation des Nations Unies au Congo* or ONUC). The SSG argued that “the UN has acquired many of the responsibilities of a colonial power” since UN forces were involved in economic matters “in the face of the inability of the Congo government to do [so],”¹⁸ while at the same time it could not replace the Congolese government.

The Congo would be the model for a new type of UN peacekeeping operation:

There is a potential role for further UNEFs elsewhere in Africa, Berlin, Formosa, and in other disputed areas. It is probable, however, that a UNEF can only be deployed if there is at least tacit agreement between the two superpowers to neutralize the area concerned. The role of the UNEFs is therefore influenced by the realities of power politics.¹⁹

The SSG staff was quite cognizant of how future situations would evolve in the context of the Cold War:

Despite the efforts of the UN, it seems likely that limited warfare will continue to occur in a variety of forms, including civil war aided and abetted by unofficially sponsored volunteers and military supplies from outside countries, boundary incidents and outright aggression. Countries initiating future international incidents are likely to so endeavour to arrange matters that the UN cannot readily become militarily involved . . . they can draw from past UN experience and avoid the mistakes of their predecessors. Thus each future UN incident may be expected to be as unique as its perpetrators can make it.²⁰

Consequently, maximum flexibility on Canada's part was required, particularly with the type of forces Canada established. They had to be capable of fighting their way out of a situation. They could not be based on a previous model like Suez. Each mission would be unique.²¹ The Chiefs of Staff Committee accepted the SSG study as the basis for UN force planning. When the study was distributed to External Affairs, it "caused considerable anguish" because of its brutally realistic approach to the facts of life in the Cold War world. External Affairs personnel like Norman Robertson and Howard Green were, however, in no position to dictate to Minister of National Defence Douglas Harkness how National Defence organized and prepared forces to meet the vague but established government policy that Canada have a UN Standby force ready to deploy globally.²²

By mid-1961, the Joint Planning Committee was brought in to clarify inter-service aspects of where the armed services stood on matters relating to UN military operations. In essence operations like Kashmir, Suez and the Congo would be the norm as opposed to Korean War-like operations. The problem was that earmarking existing Canadian forces for UN operations detracted from the main force structure dedicated to NATO commitments that were paramount to deterring nuclear war. Therefore, dual-tasking existing forces was the only answer barring additional government funds. Notably, "Limited war might occur outside UN auspices and we must retain the capability of taking part..."²³ External Affairs was kept fully informed of military developments in this field, but they rarely commented on them.²⁴

The Army's view in 1961, then, was that UN operations were not high on the priority list since "the meeting of



A less certain view. Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, Chief of the General Staff from 1951 to 1955, argued that Canada develop a tri-service force focussed on peacekeeping. The exact force structure he foresaw was never clearly articulated. (Canadian Forces Photo Unit)

these commitments inevitably detracts from the Army's ability to fulfill its wartime tasks . . . it is not considered feasible to make any reasonably accurate forecast of [additional commitments]. The best that could be done was to earmark forces and hold them at a higher state of readiness.²⁵ Lieutenant General Geoffrey Walsh, the new CGS, believed that "there is a tendency to underestimate the extent to which the [UN] commitments which this government has undertaken have an impact on the Army."²⁶

What of the Royal Canadian Navy? The Chief of the Naval Service Vice-Admiral Herbert Rayner and his staff were no slouches when it came to limited warfare trends. At the time the RCN was

preparing to reorganize the fleet to deal with new trends in warfare. As early as January 1959, the Naval Board incorporated a "General Purpose Destroyer" into future ship acquisition plans. By 1960, the Naval Board recommended that "the RCN must be prepared to assist United Nations police force actions. . . the RCN must assume it will be required to provide escorts and appropriate logistics support."²⁷

A 1961 RCN study group, the Ad Hoc Committee on Naval Objectives, examined the problem of fitting a limited warfare capability into the fleet to support UN operations. The report to the Chief of the Naval Staff, called the Brock Report, acknowledged up front that Canadian participation in UN operations was secondary to NATO and continental defence and thus geared to "stabilize situations that threaten to lead to wider conflict." It also recognized that Canadian troops assigned to these duties have been given virtually no special training: "Guerrilla warfare, equipment and inter-service training which would enable our services to so-operate effectively in other than a European-type war have played very little part in high level Canadian defence planning."²⁸

The Brock Report identified a spectrum of conflict that included no-warning nuclear attack and unlimited war as a result of escalation. Another type was limited war or "a number of situations involving national forces from one or more countries in the immediate area of the origin of hostilities." The next type was "sporadic hostilities in trouble spots," particularly Asia, Latin America and Africa where the methods were "internal disorder, subversion or infiltration and involving intervention forces from outside countries for stabilizing the situation."²⁹

As with Army thinking, there was overlap between peace operations and counter-insurgency. For economic purposes, Canada's force structure had to accommodate all contingencies with the same force structure for "limited war and 'brush fire' situations." Speed was of the essence, the study group argued, and Canada had to "posses highly mobile and flexible and versatile forces trained to prevent disorder rather than to inflame passions by the application of more force than is needed. The best police forces are equipped with motor cars and side arms, rather than tanks and mortars."³⁰

As for a naval force structure:

for limited war, intervention or policing action, the basic maritime requirement is for general purpose, versatile forces which can co-operate with the other services. . . . a capability is needed for escorting and transporting army units to almost any area in the world where trouble might develop and support them.³¹

The primary platform for such activity as envisioned by the Navy in 1961 was the General Purpose Frigate (GPF). The eight planned GPFs would be structured for brushfire wars but had the additional capability to conduct anti-submarine operations. The GPF was to carry a helicopter, an anti-aircraft missile system and a gun capable of supporting landing operations. Each GPF was also to have the capability to carry 200 troops and land them by landing craft and/or helicopter.³²

The Royal Canadian Air Force leadership kept abreast of Army and Navy efforts. Like the Navy, there had been high-level musings throughout 1959 by Air Marshal Larry Dunlap and his senior staff. They debated the difference between limited war and policing operations and concluded that there was a difference—UN operations involved "a police force in military uniform, transported by the Air Force . . ."—and that the Air Force "subscribed to the 'police concept'" without further definition.³³

In 1960, however, the annual high-level Air Force meeting of minds brought Air Commodore Fred Carpenter into the limelight on "brushfire war" issues. Carpenter was head of Air Transport Command and about to become engaged in dealing with the UN on Operation MALLARD in the Congo. He advocated a radical idea: there should be one service instead of three and it should "be a kind of combat police force. This means inaugurating a body to operate in a disarmament inspection role." Canada should have a mobile force afloat with two or three "commando carriers" that would serve "as bases in moving in police forces." Others did not go along with Carpenter's thinking, particularly the Chief of the Air Staff, since the bulk of discussion was directed towards providing air defence forces in North America and nuclear strike forces for NATO in Europe.³⁴

"The main problem for Canada now was where should it put its military resources?"


By the time the Army and Navy were producing more detailed thinking in 1961, however, there was less discussion in Air Force circles on brushfire wars. Carpenter admonished his boss for not doing enough to support the UN. Air Vice Marshal Campbell took issue with this: "We are quite willing to do things willingly vis-a-vis the Congo. As you remember originally the Government was very keen to get in there with all four feet. Well, the attitude of the coloured man to the white man quickly changed that. The treatment meted out to some of the troops makes the government wonder whether white troops should be in there."³⁵

International events accelerated the armed forces' interest in rapid deployment forces. The most important was the Berlin Crisis round in August-September 1961. Canada planned to send 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group from Canada to reinforce 4 Brigade in West Germany as part of NATO's deterrent manoeuvre at the height of the crisis. The problem was

that there was a lack of strategic lift to get it there in a timely fashion and it was very expensive besides. Similar problems affected American and British forces, which prompted changes to their force structures.³⁶ How could the two NATO reinforcement brigades in Canada be configured for more rapid deployment?

Canadian aspirations in the development of a rapid reaction UN standby capability should, therefore, be put in the context of Allied developments. British thinking on the use of a strategically air portable reserve dated back to 1953 when proposals were made to develop a rapid reinforcement capability for operations East of Suez. By 1957, the Royal Navy deployed one of four available aircraft carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean to back up a strategic air deployment. The 1958 Lebanese Crisis and the 1961 Kuwait Crisis highlighted the need for more systematic planning. By 1961, the British Army Central Strategic Reserve was reorganized into the 3rd Division (two brigades) and the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade. 38 Group RAF consisting of two ground attack squadrons, two helicopter squadrons and a variety of strategic transports worked closely with the Central Strategic Reserve. Missions for the force tended to reside on the lower intensity band of the spectrum of conflict in existing and former British colonies East of Suez and in Africa.³⁷

The United States formed a joint organization called Strike Command (STRICOM) in January 1962. STRICOM consisted of the US Army Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) and the USAF's Tactical Air Command (40 squadrons). STRAC was largely air deployable and had two airborne divisions and two infantry divisions. A 250 man company was on one hours notice to move, followed by an 1800 man battle group at four hours notice to move. The motives underlying STRICOM's creation related to problems with rapidly mobilizing and reinforcing NATO Europe during the 1961 round of the Berlin Crisis as much as developing a global limited war capability, though the Kennedy Administration strongly and



The problems of defending Canada and meeting other commitments affected force structure. Here soldiers of the Mobile Striking Force (1948 to 1955), an air transportable formation, board a C-119 Flying Boxcar. Heavy RCAF involvement was crucial for the concept to succeed. (Canadian Forces Photo Unit)

publicly advocated the development of such a capability.³⁸

The Canadian Army's post-Berlin assessment concluded that a rapid deployment capability would contribute to reinforcing Europe more efficiently and the matter of a UN Standby force could be solved simultaneously. In early 1962, the Army looked at establishing 3 Brigade as a dual-tasked NATO reinforcement and UN Standby brigade group.³⁹ One battalion in 3 Brigade was the designated UN Standby Battalion Group; it was placed on seven days notice to move. The battalion's training tasks were defined as "supervising UN-sponsored political and military arrangements; to maintain order; and to create a situation in which it can not be defied without creating an overt incident."⁴⁰ This last role was inserted to cover the projected NATO ACE Mobile Force requirements that SACEUR was currently working on.

Then the Joint Planning Committee got involved since strategic lift and sustainment was a joint task with the other services. The Navy and Air Force identified the areas in which they thought they could provide such support without seriously affecting Canada's priority NATO commitments. Matters did not proceed much beyond this brief identification and no in-depth joint planning was conducted at this time.⁴¹

This did not prevent the Army from fine-tuning its views on UN operations. In his five-year program initiated in 1962, General Walsh stated that "UN military intervention, as a result of Communist influence or infiltration, could be expected in the under-developed nations. Additionally the UN may be asked to intervene militarily should clashes develop between Western and Communist-supported nations." Once again, the Canadian conceptual link between intervention and UN "police actions" was maintained.⁴²

THE WHITE PAPER PROCESS AND MOBILE FORCE PLANNING: 1963

Newly-elected Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson promised the Canadian people a defence review, and Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer set out almost immediately to do so. The product was the 1964 White Paper on Defence, which was released in March 1964. The process by which this white paper was formulated, however, provides significant insight into the continuing Canadian conceptual overlap between counter-insurgency and peacekeeping operations and the means by which such operations were to be carried out. Essentially, Hellyer held open hearings in the House of Commons Special Committee on Defence (SCOD). At the same time, Hellyer formed the closed Ad Hoc Committee on Defence consisting of

military and civilian analytical personnel from the three services. In addition to these forums, several tri-service committees were struck to examine specific military problems. All of these inputs flowed back to Hellyer and the White Paper was derived from this data by the Minister himself.

SCOD, held in June 1963, was designed to allow a variety of views to be aired and trial balloons launched. It was essentially a politically antagonistic brain-storming session that allowed the Pearson government

to claim it was involved in bi-partisan defence policy formulation, something that was new to the Canadian political process. Many influential ideas developed during the hearings gained saliency during the re-organization of the armed forces.

Hellyer's presentation to SCOD subordinated UN peacekeeping to NATO operations. His view at the time was that "from time to time suggestions have been made that we should turn over part of our armed forces to the UN. To date there has been no inclination on the part of the UN to accept this kind of offer and the maintenance of a standby battalion . . . seems to be the best alternative in these circumstances."

⁴³ In fact, the bulk of discussion on Hellyer's presentation related to nuclear weapons and NATO strategy.

Each service presented its current establishment and deployment. The Navy ignored UN operations in its presentation. The Army explained that UN operations provided the variety that was necessary to offset the boredom of garrison life in Canada. SCOD members also learned that the standby battalion had, in fact, been alerted for service in Lebanon and in the Congo and that the designated unit exercised regularly. In one case, "last month we moved the battalion from Valcartier to Wainwright, and on landing it carried out an exercise to restore law and order."⁴⁴ No eye-

brows were raised amongst the SCOD members. The Air Force presentation noted the number of UN airlift operations it had supported, but as with previous presentations, the question and answer period revolved around NATO and nuclear weapons.⁴⁵

SCOD also heard from Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin. Building on his existing foundation, Martin told the committee that:

we have been living under a massive threat from militant communism in circumstances of cold war which robbed the United Nations of its ability to perform its main peace-keeping operations under article 43 of the charter. Clearly our first duty has been to help maintain the peace through collective security arrangements, and this we have done through playing our full part in NATO and NORAD consistent with our resources. It represents our contribution to the deterrent, which has successfully kept a precarious peace. . . .⁴⁶

Martin also noted that:

at the same time and in the same period, there has been an urgent need to improve the international means of dealing with limited wars and regional disputes and otherwise developing the means for a peaceful settlement of potentially dangerous conflicts. Here our support for the United Nations both in its mediation functions and its peacekeeping roles has been the main vehicle for Canadian action.⁴⁷

The main problem for Canada now was where should it put its military resources? Martin believed that there should be more focus on developing means to deal with limited conflict, but did not specifically refer to UN peacekeeping as the mechanism to do so.⁴⁸ Again, as before, NATO and nuclear weapons dominated the discussion agenda.

There was one blip, however. A retired Navy Commodore, James Plomer, leveled a series of public accusations

against the Navy leadership. Plomer's attack was comprehensive and he noted that there was a lack of strategic sea-lift. As if to ridicule the status quo, Plomer cited a plan to rent a Canadian Steamship Lines freighter for the sum of one dollar so that Canada's ONUC contingent could deploy.⁴⁹ Opposition members in SCOD pursued this, perhaps as a means of embarrassing the government, and implied that the government was not doing enough to support the UN with naval forces. The Chief of the Naval Staff, Herbert Rayner, pointed out that there were no standing UN naval commitments and "Our present ships are adaptable to the peace-keeping or policing operations. If there was going to be more emphasis placed on that role then we would move to a certain type of ship."



Terror in the Congo. Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Mayer of the Canadian Guards (right) speaks to Congolese troops prior to a Canadian operation to rescue missionaries. Mayer received the George Medal for his efforts. (Canadian Forces Photo Unit)

The priority was, however, hunting Soviet nuclear missile submarines in the North Atlantic.⁵⁰

SCOD also heard from the now-retired Lieutenant General Guy Simonds, former Chief of the General Staff, and General Charles Foulkes, the former Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Simonds had definite ideas on the future of the Canadian armed forces, and he was not shy about presenting them:

I believe that a role which is suited to a country of our size and having regard to the financial burdens possible to be borne out over a lengthy term, would be a tri-service force whose main objective was peace-keeping. I believe its organization should be very much like that of the United States Marine Corps, which is a mobile force complete with all its ancillaries and able to meet what are commonly called brushfire situations.⁵¹

Simonds thought Canada should move away from nuclear commitments in the NATO Central Region and focus on making "a contribution to preventing a situation developing which would lead to thermonuclear exchange."⁵² It

is unclear, exactly, as to what Simonds was referring. It appears to have been a hybrid between NATO's ACE Mobile Force and a UN peacekeeping force, something which was rapidly deployable and either capable of fighting a low intensity war to generate a peaceful environment or a force to be inserted after peace had been made through the UN. He did indicate that it should be the size of a division and equipped with strategic air transport.⁵³

Charles Foulkes was then grilled on the possibility of a Canadian mobile force for peacekeeping. Foulkes had originally suggested back in 1959 that the brigade group committed to NATO in West Germany should be re-equipped as an air-portable formation capable of nuclear and conventional operations. The committee members, not coming from a military background, were clearly confused and tended to lump all points on the spectrum of conflict short of nuclear war together. They thought Foulkes had been referring to a concept similar to Simonds.⁵⁴

Foulkes chose to address the idea about turning over the entire Canadian armed forces to the UN. The former Chairman noted that Canada had played critical roles in UN peace operations and that the UN should have some permanent standby arrangement with member countries but that turning the Canadian forces into such a force was ridiculous. Foulkes pointed out that even UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld did not think this was feasible since each emergency situation demanded a different type of response:

To suggest that Canada should put all of its forces at the disposal of the United Nations is not a sound proposition. . . . it should be constant Canadian policy to make our armed forces available for United Nations service as required. This does not mean, however, that Canada or any other country is expected to turn over its forces to the direction of a non-existent United Nations command to be used in accordance with the will of any fleeting majority in the Security Council or assembly.⁵⁵

Eventually, SCOD called back Lieutenant-General Geoffrey Walsh, the Chief of the General Staff, for more extensive discussions about strategic lift for a mobile force. Walsh had to explain in great detail that there was one brigade group deployed in West Germany and two more in Canada dedicated to NATO as a strategic reserve force. There was an additional brigade group for operations in North America. There was not enough shipping to move the two Canada-based brigades with



Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, The Black Watch of Canada (Royal Highland Regiment) boarding HMCS Algonquin for an amphibious exercise in 1959. (Canadian Forces Photo Unit)

their tanks, vehicles, ammunition and artillery to Europe in an emergency—this had been tested during the 1961 Berlin Crisis but the previous government chose not to do anything about it.⁵⁶

After SCOD wrapped up, Hellyer formed several internal committees to explore the ideas in more detail. One of these was the Mobile Force Committee, which met from August to November 1963. Hellyer instructed the Committee to determine what such a force would look like and how much would it cost. Specifically, he instructed the Committee:

The type of mobile force I have in mind is basically an air transportable fighting unit which could be airlifted with its equipment for quick deployment anywhere in the world. The force should be mechanized and have a high fire power and great flexibility which would make it adaptable to varying circumstances. It should be flexible enough that it could form part of the mobile reserve of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe or serve in a United Nations operation or other circumstances as required to meet national policy. It may be desirable that some units be air droppable, but the principle

criterion is air portability of the entire force.⁵⁷

The Minister thought that the force should be of division size with its own air transport and close air support capability. Thought was to be given to ability to lift the force by sea and land it.

The Joint Planning Committee set about fulfilling the Minister's direction, but there was some confusion. When Hellyer used the term "mobile force," was he referring to NATO's ACE Mobile Force (Land) (AMF[L]), the multinational brigade group of which Canada was not yet a member? If he was, this didn't make sense since AMF(L) was to act as a "show of force" deterrent manoeuvre on NATO's flanks. AMF(L) had special deployment criteria in a crisis situation with the Soviets so that this manoeuvre could be made. How was the Canadian mobile force supposed to interface with this? There was also the question of a force having a high volume of firepower and at the same time being light and air portable. Was that firepower to be nuclear, conventional or both?⁵⁸ There was no further direction, and the committee went off on its own to deliberate.

The mobile force committee concluded that such a Canadian force could fulfill defence of Canada and NATO

ACE Mobile Force tasks, but that the UN task was "more difficult as it could range from a UN police-type effort similar to the Congo or UNEF force to the Korean-type conflict."⁵⁹ The existing models examined by the committee included the US Marine Corps, the US Army Strike Command, the UK Strategic Reserve force and UNEF I. Essentially, the planners were looking for a division that could morph into whatever role was needed at the time. An early concept was devised where there was a brigade group dedicated to NATO AMF(L) missions, an airborne brigade group and an amphibious brigade group for UN tasks.⁶⁰

There were still many things to be clarified. Air Marshal Miller, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, elaborated where he thought he should. The problem was one of nuclear armament. If the mobile force was going to participate in NATO operations either alongside the AMF(L) or other NATO formations, it had to have a nuclear capability for it to function within NATO's strategic framework. Miller thought that the Canadian mobile force should be nuclear capable and "posses equipment which was nuclear adaptable" like the air-portable Little John nuclear rocket which could be carried by helicopter.⁶¹

All involved noted the serious obstacles to the creation of such a force. No companion study on strategic air or sea lift had been conducted, so that if the Canadian mobile force were to be created from the existing Army units, it would still be in the same boat as it was during the 1961 Berlin Crisis. Secondly, the structure for the planned mobile force was dependent on equipment and technologies that did not exist or were unavailable at that time. Fielding this force would be an expensive proposition. Finally, such a force would be light on the ground in the NATO context. This was unacceptable since the enemy forces were heavily mechanized with tanks, armoured personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery. Such a force might be able to function in a UN context but not in a NATO one, and, there-



fore, it was incapable of meeting the Minister's requirements.⁶²

Hellyer finally redefined the committee's terms of reference. Could the West Germany-based heavy mechanized brigade co-exist with the mobile force? This would solve the NATO problem. The mobile force could then come from the three brigade groups based in Canada.⁶³ A Joint Service Study Group was also formed to look at strategic lift. Their report was quite pessimistic: there was barely enough airlift to move one battalion, let alone nine.⁶⁴ Hellyer's demand that the mobile force have its

***"... the mobile force planners
were never able to reconcile
the need for mechanization and
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own close air support capability caused a certain amount of heartache with the Air Force, which was not used to joint operations. In any event, the Air Force members thought that a squadron of F-4C Phantom II should be acquired for recce and interdiction, while two squadrons of A-6 Intruders or A4D Skyhawks could provide close air support to the mobile force. All three aircraft types were dual capable conventional-nuclear delivery platforms.⁶⁵

In their final analysis, the mobile force planners were never able to reconcile the need for mechanization and the requirement that the force be light and air portable. They were frustrated

in their attempts to design a formation with homogeneous brigades. The strategic lift issue was one that needed to be addressed jointly at a higher level. Hellyer's insistence that the formation be capable of instantaneous deployment into an incredibly varied set of scenarios proved too much for the committee to handle, though they were intellectually honest in their approach to the problem.

Hellyer formed the Ad Hoc Committee on Defence Policy, which carried out its deliberations concurrent with the mobile force and other committees. Since the final product of this committee seriously influenced the 1964 White Paper, it is useful to examine its conclusions on the role of the UN and UN peacekeeping in Canadian national security policy.

Led by Dr. R.J. Sutherland of the Defence Research Board, the five-man tri-service committee explored where Canadian defence and foreign policy had been since 1945 and where it was going well into the 1970s. Hellyer's terms of reference for the committee included the development of alternatives to the status quo. The primary focus was on the NATO commitments, whether or not Canada could or should disengage from them, and to what degree was this possible or even desirable.⁶⁶ The report concluded that "the purpose of Canadian defence programmes and activities is to support an alliance policy. In terms of Canadian national interests, the rationale of Canadian defence is to maintain influence with our allies. The immediate purpose of Canadian defence is to serve as an effective support of Canada's intra-alliance diplomacy." Therefore, was the UN a more effective agent than NATO, the Commonwealth or the Canada-US relationship in the achievement of these objectives?

Essentially, there were two predominant public views on the future of the UN. Either the UN would become a "functioning world government" or it would cease to exist. If the UN were to


change from the status quo of 1963, it would do so through uncontrolled international forces not through “the proliferation of ingenuous schemes by persons who, being unable to reform the world, believe they can reform the United Nations.” The Security Council was “impotent,” and the probable trend was “more effective Great Power diplomacy pursued independently of the UN.” The UN General Assembly was a “world debating forum which reflects neither the realities of power nor a political consensus.” That said, however, “the UN will continue to serve as the focus of a non-public multilateral diplomacy.”⁶⁷

What about UN peacekeeping? The members thought that interested parties were delving into the minutiae of UN operations to the detriment of more fundamental issues. The three existing control bodies of the UN—the Security Council, General Assembly, and Secretary-General—were in varying degrees incapable of positive sustained action. The possibility of a new controlling body for peace operations existed but “any organ of the UN which does not reflect the realities of power cannot make effective use of force. To ignore this is probably the one sure means of destroying the UN.”⁶⁸

The report also tackled the “UN Army” concept:

It is worth noticing that the enthusiastic support for a permanent UN military force which is felt by certain Western nations such as Canada, the Scandinavian countries and Ireland, is not shared by the great majority of Afro-Asian, including such important nations as India. The reasons are not hard to find. Few Canadians would welcome the idea that the UN should interest itself in the grievances of the North American Indian, the rights of the Sons of Freedom or the Columbia River Treaty. The majority of Afro-Asians regards a permanent UN military force as a potential instrument of intervention in matters which they consider with equal definiteness to be their own business.⁶⁹

Canadian Army Standby Force 1963 - 1964



Infantry Grouping
had four options:
Battalion
Battalion (-)
Company Group
Battalion with armour squadron

Could also include:
Signal Platoon, Engineer Troop
and Service Platoon

Figure 1 - Canadian Army Standby Force 1963 - 1964

Canada should not, however, shy away from participating in UN peace operations. The problem was a preoccupation in the media and in academia that Canada should re-orient the armed forces strictly for UN operations: “Such proposals have tended to be conceived in the abstract and without much regard to the tangible circumstances of the UN or for Canadian national interest. In some cases, political innocence has been carried to rather excessive lengths.”⁷⁰

The committee looked askance at these ideas since “it is quite possible that Canada would be instructed to make war on South Africa or to defend Cuba against the United States.” Therefore, the most likely Canadian employment of force under the UN umbrella was the provision of “technical troops not readily available from other sources,” airlift and light aircraft and staff officers since “it is unlikely that Canadian combatant forces would be acceptable.” This was not just because Canada was part of NATO, as alleged by many detractors, since “Canada is a white nation. Canada is too powerful a nation to be innocuous and Canada’s interests are too clearly

identified with those of the North Atlantic community to qualify as a neutral.”⁷¹

The drafting of the new defence policy continued throughout late 1963 and early 1964. Hellyer wrote the first draft himself, which was then sent to External Affairs for comment. There were two major differences of opinion between the departments: Hellyer’s views on NATO strategy and Hellyer’s views on UN peacekeeping.

Hellyer wanted to explain to the public that massive retaliation and trip wire nuclear defence doctrines were obsolete in the 1960s. He took pains in the draft to explain that Canada’s forces had to be able to operate or flexibly respond across the whole spectrum of military force (from peace observation to nuclear warfare) in order to deter as well as fight if necessary. This was in accordance with the general direction of NATO strategy in 1963. The External Affairs personnel altered this to emphasize that flexibility in Canadian force structure was necessary so that the majority of Canadian forces at home would be available for UN duty. Hellyer




Figure 2 - Outline Organization Army Division - Mobile Force, 1963

was, in effect, skeptical about the future utility of UN peacekeeping. Similarly, Hellyer's section on UN peacekeeping was a far more critical one than the final version which was influenced by External Affairs. Hellyer was quite critical of UN operations and the validity of UN standby forces. All of this was removed and replaced with a list of Canadian participation in the UN operations, a section which had a smug, self-congratulatory tone.⁷²

The final version of the White Paper was a departure from previous defence statements: it was explicit, clear and public. NATO deterrence operations were clearly ascendant. The objective of Canadian defence policy was "to preserve the peace by supporting collective defence measures to deter military aggression" and then "support Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of our participation in international organizations."⁷³

The main threat to Canadian interests was still the Soviet nuclear and conventional forces directed against the NATO Area. Notably, however, the policy now recognized that "Communist countries can be expected to continue to promote expansionist aims by measures short of all-out war." Canadian defence policy formally recognized a spectrum of conflict and formally set

out to institutionalize its force structure to operate within it. Canada anticipated having NATO forces hold the line and UN peace operations to handle crises that might affect superpower peace.⁷⁴

The controversial part of the White Paper did not involve strategy or objectives. It was the section on the future shape of the Canadian forces which overrode all things. Hellyer proposed the merger of all three services into a single service, essentially one big "trihibious" interoperable mobile force—the details of that controversy are beyond the scope of this work.⁷⁵ Within that great new structure, one brigade group was to remain in Europe for service with NATO, while two of the Canada-based brigade groups would be retrained and re-equipped "to permit their effective deployment in circumstances ranging from service [with NATO] to United Nations peacekeeping operations." The fourth brigade group was to be modified into an air-portable formation for rapid deployment.⁷⁶

Where the White Paper fell down was on the question of strategic lift. A small section noted that a modest capability should be acquired, but there were no specifics. There was a lot of talk about mobility and flexibility but not how to achieve it.

FROM ARMY TO MOBILE COMMAND: 1964

The Army was not idle during the 1964 White Paper process and was engaged in anticipatory planning throughout 1963. Army planners believed that the main front was still NATO's Central Region. Army appreciation of the future world situation, however, placed some emphasis on preparing for "peripheral wars" that were "local in scale and will probably involve the Western powers in peace-keeping rather than fighting roles." In

addition to maintaining a capability to react to those, Army planners assumed that a global capability be retained by the smaller Western powers "so that a confrontation of the major powers can be avoided." In other words, pro-NATO middle powers should be able to take on peripheral conflicts as surrogates.⁷⁷

For the 1960s, Army planners thought there would be continuing moves towards the creation of a standing international UN force, but the more probable type of UN operations would remain the Suez, Lebanon and Congo variants. The participation of Army combat units was "unlikely to be accepted . . . from a nation so firmly in the Western camp as Canada." The deployment of technical units, as in the UNEF I and ONUC, was more likely.⁷⁸

The main problem was training and organization to operate across a spectrum of conflict that included nuclear war, conventional mechanized war, counter-insurgency and peacekeeping. Consequently, the forces required to fight in the main battle area in NATO's Central Region "are neither organized nor equipped for the type of role Canada is likely to assume in UN operations." To do so would necessitate having two sets of equipment and two training syllabi. There would have to be two armies.⁷⁹ To be fair, by 1963, many in the Army were skeptical about the UN standby battalion role. In their view "at no time has the demanded or agreed

upon Canadian contribution for a UN operation matched the Canadian Army units assigned to the UN standby role." Maintaining forces that would not be sent at such a high readiness placed great strains on the personnel.⁸⁰

Paul Hellyer thought the Army was dragging its feet. In early 1964 he committed Canada to providing two infantry battalions to NATO's ACE Mobile Force (Land). He was interested in:

pressuring the Canadian military into beefing up the capability of our land forces and giving that capability higher priority vis-a-vis the nuclear concept than they had been willing to do. I felt that a well-equipped, well-trained "bird in the hand" was of greater potential use than a non-existent division to be mobilized over some ill-defined period.⁸¹

Chief of the General Staff Geoffrey Walsh then converted 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (2 CIBG) to "a Special Service Force [SSF] with an emphasis on air portability" on 26 March 1964.⁸² By November, 2 CIBG was the repository of the AMF(L) commitments and the existing UN Standby Battalion role.⁸³ Therefore, Canada had a mechanized brigade group in West Germany as part of NATO, this new, barely air portable SSF and two other brigade groups that were supposed to handle defence of Canada operations and serve as reinforcements to the Germany-based brigade group. In effect, 2 Brigade became the Army's low intensity conflict rapid deployment force.⁸⁴

Indeed, SSF elements were utilized twice before the Army was disbanded. When inter-communal violence in Cyprus threatened NATO interests on the island in 1964, Canada's UN Standby Battalion Group (based on 1 R22^{er}) was activated and deployed, closely followed by the RCD Recce Squadron, to form the Canadian Contingent of the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Operation SNOW GOOSE also used the aircraft carrier HMCS *Bonaventure* and

the destroyer HMCS *Restigouche* in addition to strategic airlift provided by RCAF Air Transport Command Yukon, Northstar and Hercules aircraft. The air deployment was initiated within 24 hours of Cabinet deciding to send the UN Standby Battalion Group, and within four days the naval task group departed. As the situation in Cyprus deteriorated in mid 1964, UNFICYP required more robust command and control capabilities. Consequently, headquarters 2 CIBG (the SSF headquarters in Petawawa) deployed in April 1964.⁸⁵

"The obstacles in this vast project were incredible in that it necessitated severe cultural shifts which took years to implement."

The 1964 White Paper was released in March 1964 at the height of the crisis in Cyprus. Over the next year, the Army, Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian Air Force and their associated headquarters ceased to exist in an exercise referred to as "unification." The replacement organization was the Canadian Armed Forces led by a Chief of the Defence Staff who commanded Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ). It consisted of several functional commands that reported directly to CFHQ. The functional commands included Maritime Command (Atlantic) and Maritime Command (Pacific)—

which incorporated the naval and maritime anti-submarine forces on each coast—Air Defence Command, Air Transport Command, 1 Air Division (the NATO-committed nuclear strike force in Europe), 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (the NATO-committed land force in Europe) and Mobile Command.⁸⁶

The obstacles in this vast project were incredible in that it necessitated severe cultural shifts which took years to implement. There was no Army or Army headquarters, so much corporate know-

edge was in danger of being lost in the interim. Continuity of operations overseas was also in danger of disruption. Mobile Command was now responsible for peacekeeping and low intensity operations, while the rest of the commands handled the deterrent forces in North America and Europe. The

matter of Canada possessing the ability to deploy Mobile Command became a secondary issue for the time being.

Part II of this article will explore the role of General Jean Victor Allard in the creation of FMC, how FMC was originally structured and equipped, and what roles it was supposed to undertake.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Dr Sean Maloney received his BA and MA from the University of New Brunswick and his Ph.D from Temple University in Philadelphia. His military service included duty with the 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) as a troop officer and the official historian to 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. His writing and research focuses on Canadian national security policy. Dr Maloney's publications include *War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951 – 1993* (1997), numerous articles and the forthcoming book *Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada's Cold War Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 1951 – 1968*. He is currently the Social Sciences Humanities Research Council of Canada Post-Doctoral Fellow at The Royal Military College of Canada, where he also teaches in the War Studies Programme.

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The Battle of Tanga Bay

by Captain Mark Godefroy

*Steam down to Tanga
Over the briny main
See our Major-General
And his brilliant train.
Three Brigade Commanders
Colonels, staff galore;
Majors count for little,
Captains they ignore.*

*Earnestly they study
Each his little book
Which, compiled in Simla,
Tells him where to look.
Local knowledge needed?
Native scouts of use?
For so quaint a notion
There is small excuse.*

*See them shortly landing
At the chosen spot,
Find the local climate
Just a trifle hot.
Foes unsympathetic,
Maxims on them train
Careful first to signal
Range to ascertain.*

*Ping, ping, go the bullets
Crash! Explode the shells,
Major-General's worried
Thinks it's just as well
Not to move too rashly
While he's in the dark.
What's the strength opposing?
Orders re-embark.*

*Back to old Mombasa
Steams "B" Force again.
Are these generals ruffled?
Not the smallest grain.
Martial regulations
Inform us day by day.
They may have fozzled Tanga
But they've taken B.E.A.*

Composed by a
British civil servant
stationed in Mombasa,
British East Africa (B.E.A.),
November 1914.

As Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck, commander of the defence forces of German East Africa, surveyed the scene in Tanga Bay on the evening of November 3rd, 1914, he was struck by the air of confusion that prevailed over the noisy scene unfolding before his eyes. With the lights of the British transport ships blazing, members of Indian Expeditionary Force 'B' unloaded supplies destined for the beaches within field gun range of the shore. Unfortunately, von Lettow-Vorbeck's two field guns had not arrived from New Moshi. His Maxim machine guns would have little effect and would only draw fire from the 4.7- and 6-inch guns of HMS *Fox*, a British cruiser assigned to protect the flotilla lying at anchor offshore. As he took stock of the situation and the apparent superiority in numbers of British troops (some 8,000 men), von Lettow-Vorbeck could not help wondering whether his small force of Europeans and Askaris (native troops) would be able to hold off Force 'B' and retain control of Tanga. In the following days, however, the ineffectiveness of the British and Indian troops would become apparent, and von Lettow-Vorbeck would revel in the abilities of his own Schutztruppe at waging bush warfare. For the British, Tanga would be their first major military foray in Africa and their most embarrassing failure of the war to date. For the Germans, Tanga would symbolize the effectiveness of employing native troops and promote the recruitment of more Africans into the Schutztruppe. The question that remains is why did the British attack on Tanga fail as miserably as it did? What factors contributed to the British failure and ultimately to German success? And what lessons, if any, were learned and applied to the remainder of the campaign?

The foundation of Germany's empire in Africa was laid in 1884 with the creation of Southwest Africa,

Togoland and the Cameroons. The German move was actually quite ironic, for German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was an isolationist at heart and cared little for the notion of expanding Germany's sphere of influence beyond its own borders. However, it is widely believed that this colonial foray was instigated by Bismarck in an attempt to cause Great Britain a political setback and put her on the defensive.¹

Meanwhile, unbeknownst to Bismarck, another German was inadvertently influencing the political situation in Africa in favour of Germany. A German scholar by the name of Dr. Carl Peters had made his way to the continent in 1884 posing as the head of a private organization called the Society for German Colonization. In a little over three months he had claimed approximately 60,000 square miles of no-man's-land in eastern Africa (in the area of what is now Tanzania), nominally owned by the Arab Sultanate of Zanzibar, in the name of the Society. When Bismarck learned of Peters' acquisitions, he saw yet another opportunity to upset the British; Peters' Society was soon granted a charter by the Kaiser and became the German East Africa Company.²

However, disagreements between the Company and the Sultanate over customs duties and import taxes accruing to the Sultan soon emerged and came to a head in 1888. Tension over taxation, coupled with Arab resentment of Company anti-slavery measures, soon led to a conflict that quickly spread throughout the colony and threatened German control. By 1890 Peters and his Company had proven themselves incapable of re-establishing order in the colony, and the German government had to step in to remedy the situation. A German officer was dispatched to the region with the task of raising a force and crushing the Arab revolt. Six hundred Askaris were quickly recruited

from British Sudan, and within a year the revolt was crushed. Following the revolt, the German East Africa Company was dissolved and Germany half-heartedly accepted responsibility for administration of the region.

The situation in the colony had improved little with the assumption of German government rule. Eastern Africa was populated by a number of tribes, some of which readily accepted their new rulers, while others required 'coaxing' to bring them into the fold. Coaxing was most often achieved through the mounting of punitive expeditions against the offending tribes. In fact, between 1889 and 1904 the German *Schutztruppe* (as the colonial defence force came to be known) mounted approximately seventy-five punitive expeditions throughout German East Africa.³ However, the most serious threat to German rule occurred in 1905, when an uprising known as the Maji-Maji Rebellion swept the southern half of the colony. For two years, the *Schutztruppe* conducted a scorched earth campaign, burning villages, forests and cultivable land in their efforts to root out the rebels. By 1907 the rebellion was crushed, its leaders rounded up and German East Africa entered a period of relative stability.

This stability may be attributed to two factors: the maturing of the *Schutztruppe* into a highly efficient bush fighting force and the development and enforcement of new policies by Germany's Colonial Office to curb racial oppression and promote African welfare.⁴

The metamorphosis of the *Schutztruppe* had resulted from the recruitment of more native Africans into the force and the equal application of harsh Prussian discipline in training to both native and non-native troops. Moreover, Askari troops were paid almost double what their counterparts in the British colonies received, and German officers took particular pains to respect the tribal customs and traditions of their men.⁵

New policies regarding the administration of the German colonies had

come about in 1907 with the appointment of Dr. Bernhard Dernburg as the head of the newly formed German Colonial Office. Reports of the Maji-Maji Rebellion and the extreme methods employed to put it down had reached Germany the year before and shocked many ordinary citizens.⁶ It was generally agreed that a more progressive attitude towards administration of the colonies and the treatment of its

"German officers took particular pains to respect the tribal customs and traditions of their men."

native citizens was required if the colonies were to pay dividends to the Fatherland. East Africa's newly-appointed governor, Albrecht von Rechenburg, embraced the new policies of the Colonial Office and worked diligently to improve both the quality of life of native Africans and develop East Africa's fledgling transportation infrastructure—specifically, the Northern and Central Railways, along with the ports of Dar es Salaam and Tanga. Dr. Heinrich Schnee, Rechenburg's successor, continued the policies of his predecessor and instituted a number of his own initiatives. Amongst these was the establishment of a small but successful education program for the native population and the building of a number of research stations in the colony.⁷ On the eve of the First World War, German East Africa boasted a bustling economy and a well-trained and adequately equipped colonial defence force.

Word that Britain and Germany were at war did not reach German East Africa until August 8th, 1914. Von Lettow-Vorbeck had anticipated the eventuality of war with the Allied powers and had made preparations to ensure that his *Schutztruppe* would be ready to fight when called upon. After arriving in the region in January 1914, von Lettow-Vorbeck had the opportunity to reconnoitre the country and form his own conclusions about the strategic importance of German East Africa. Von Lettow-Vorbeck noted that British East Africa, which lay to the north, controlled

German entry to the Suez Canal and South Africa, which lay to the east, controlled navigation around the Cape. In the event of war, lines of communication to the German colony could easily be severed by the Allied powers. When von Lettow-Vorbeck received news of the British declaration, he immediately rushed to Schnee to discuss plans to defend the colony. Borrowing on experience gained fighting tribal wars in German Southwest Africa in 1904, von Lettow-Vorbeck saw the need to resort to offensive action and adopt guerilla tactics to fight numerically superior British forces in British East Africa (B.E.A.) and Uganda. He also noted the importance played by the Uganda Railway,⁸

which ran from Mombasa to Nairobi, on the economy of B.E.A. He suggested that the best course of action for Germany would be to interdict the rail line, a move that would hamper British communications and troop movement.⁹

However, Schnee was strongly opposed to such a move. The Congo Act of 1885, signed by all European nations competing for colonies in Africa, stipulated that in case of war between the signatories, the African colonies of the belligerents would all remain neutral, provided everyone agreed.¹⁰ Thus, when war broke out in Europe, Schnee believed that the provisions of the Act would be adhered to and the colonists of German East Africa would be spared the nasty trials and tribulations of war. It was obvious to Schnee that any military action would nullify the provisions of the Act and bring war to Africa. Von Lettow-Vorbeck grudgingly accepted Schnee's decision and requested permission to move his *Schutztruppe* to New Moshi, a small town at the base of Mount Kilimanjaro opposite the border with B.E.A. and paralleling the British Northern Railway. Schnee, fearing that such a move would antagonize the British and put von Lettow-Vorbeck in a better position to execute his planned operation against the Northern Railway, vetoed the request and instead ordered him to move the *Schutztruppe* to Pugu, in the interior of the colony.

The first act of war in eastern Africa was carried out by the German navy

attack on Tanga. This force, commanded by Major-General Arthur Aitken, was known as Indian Expeditionary Force 'B' and was composed of the following units: the 27th Bangalore Brigade (commanded by Major-General R. Wapshare), consisting of the 2nd Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, the 63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry, the 98th Infantry, the 101st Grenadiers, the 28th Mountain Battery RA, the 25th and 26th Companies Sappers and Miners and the 61st KGO Pioneers; the Imperial Service Brigade (commanded by Brigadier-General M.J. Tighe), which was comprised of the 13th Rajputs, the 2nd Kashmir Rifles, a half battalion of the 3rd Kashmir Rifles and a half battalion of the 3rd Gwalior Rifles.¹⁴ "Force 'B,'" as it came to be known, was comprised of 8,000 poorly trained men of questionable quality. Captain R. Meinertzhagen, an intelligence staff officer serving in Aitken's Headquarters is said to have remarked:

"Neither am I enthusiastic about the troops sent with the force. They constitute the worst in India, and I tremble to think what may happen if we meet with serious opposition. I have seen many of the men and they do not impress me at all, either as men or as soldiers. Two battalions have no machine guns and the senior officers are nearer to fossils than active, energetic leaders of men. But it serves no useful purpose being critical at this stage. One can only hope for the best and rely on our British battalion, Mountain Battery and the element of surprise."¹⁵

Unfortunately, there was little secrecy surrounding the planned British assault on Tanga. British newspapers in Mombasa alluded to the assault, as had intercepted wireless messages from the Belgian Congo. Furthermore, German citizens living in Mombasa noted the British preparations and wrote to relatives in Tanga advising them of what they saw. Finally, von Lettow-Vorbeck had developed a rather efficient system amongst the natives of gathering information on the enemy's activities that kept him apprised of their every move.

All of these factors combined to warn von Lettow-Vorbeck of the imminent threat to Tanga and allow him ample opportunity to reconnoiter the ground and plan the defence of the town.

Following a series of minor actions by the German *Schutztruppe* in September and October against Stewart's troops in the Southwest region of B.E.A., Force 'B' steamed lazily into the port of Mombasa. While the staff disembarked to plan the operation in detail, the troops remained cooped up in the holds of the tiny transports that had ferried them across the Indian Ocean from the port of Bombay.

***"Unfortunately,
there was little secrecy
surrounding the
planned British assault
on Tanga."***

While crossing to Mombasa, General Aitken had been apprised of the tenacity and fighting effectiveness of the *Schutztruppe* by Captain Meinertzhagen, who had spent some time in East Africa and had had an opportunity to view their training firsthand. But Aitken was so confident in the readiness of his own troops and ignorant of the formidable fighting ability of the *Schutztruppe* Askaris, he is said to have remarked that "the Indian Army will make short work of a lot of niggers."¹⁶

As the planning continued in earnest in Mombasa, it became apparent that none of the staff had much knowledge of the enemy or terrain, particularly in and around Tanga.¹⁷ In actual fact, no one really seemed to care. Aitken was convinced that when the troop transports, accompanied by HMS *Fox* under the command of Captain F.W. Caufield, steamed into Tanga Bay, the Germans would immediately surrender, if there were any Germans left in Tanga at all. Recent reports had indicated that they had vacated the town and that it stood unoccupied. In fact, General Aitken's orders for the assault read, "From reliable information received it appears improb-

able that the enemy will actively oppose our landing."¹⁸ If necessary, HMS *Fox* would provide firepower to cover the landing, but it was unlikely that it would come to that.

But not all of Aitken's staff shared his views. Meinertzhagen attempted to point out the speed with which von Lettow-Vorbeck could move troops down the Northern Railway from New Moshi to Tanga and Lieutenant-Colonel B.R. Graham, who commanded a battalion of the KAR, offered to provide a force to scout and cover the landings around Tanga.¹⁹ However, Aitken was ambivalent to this information and offer of support. There would be no need for support from the Africans; his Indian troops were capable of taking Tanga on their own.

The plan of attack finally agreed upon by Aitken and his staff was a rather simple one. Upon arrival at Tanga, HMS *Fox* would sweep the harbour for mines and locate a suitable landing beach. The Imperial Service Brigade would then be the first to disembark and be responsible for establishing a bridgehead. Then the Bangalore Brigade would land and move north along the Northern Railway, linking up with General Stewart's force around New Moshi and Longido. There were some caveats, though. During the course of staff discussions, the issues of the political situation in East Africa and Governor Schnee's truces were raised.²⁰ Caufield was unaware of any truces but was insistent that if the Germans believed that a truce was in place, it was incumbent upon the force to ensure that they understood otherwise before any shots were fired. Aitken agreed and decided that, given the reports received to date, losing the element of surprise was far outweighed by the requirement to adhere to the laws of war.²¹ Now all Meinertzhagen could hope for was that the British battalion and the Mountain Battery would do their 'bit.'

On November 1st, Force 'B' weighed anchor at Mombasa and moved south in sight of the coast towards Tanga. As the convoy moved along the coast, von Lettow-Vorbeck's 'jungle wireless system'—which included a series of outposts and signal fires—monitored its

progress and reported on its location. In this manner, von Lettow-Vorbeck was able to determine approximately when Force 'B' would arrive and begin moving elements of his *Schutztruppe* south from New Moshi in time to meet the British.

Not that there was a great deal of urgency required. Upon arrival at Tanga, HMS *Fox* sailed cautiously into the harbour under a white flag to formally announce to the Germans that any truces previously negotiated had been repudiated and demand the surrender of the town. Meeting with German District Commissioner Auracher aboard HMS *Fox*, Caufield explained the situation and warned that if the Germans refused to comply, the town would be bombarded. Auracher advised Caufield that he did not have the authority to surrender the town and he would have to consult a higher authority. Caufield was also concerned about whether the harbour had been mined and advised Auracher that if he did not divulge information regarding the location of the mines, he would be shot. The truth of the matter was that there were no mines to speak of; fortunately for Auracher, the British did not have a translator and the issue was brushed aside as he attempted to reiterate Governor Schnee's position regarding 'open cities'.

"The scene on the beach was unimpressive to say the least."

Upon leaving HMS *Fox*, Auracher returned to his office and sent a telegram to von Lettow-Vorbeck advising him of the British demand. He then sent another to Schnee advising him of his temporary resignation from the civil service to serve in the *Schutztruppe*. That done, he lowered the white flag flying over government building and raised the imperial German flag in its place. He then went home, donned his uniform and joined the *Schutztruppe* company camped on the outskirts of town.²²

Caufield waited approximately an hour and a half after Auracher's depar-




Figure 2 - The Battle of Tanga - November 2nd to 5th, 1914

ture from HMS *Fox* before realizing that he would not be back. He then contacted Aitken to advise him of all he had done to secure the German surrender and of the German response (or lack thereof). Not receiving any further direction from Aitken, Caufield decided to move out of the harbour and rejoin the convoy. Caufield had been left with an uneasy feeling about the suspected presence of mines in the harbour, a feeling that remained even after the minesweepers were unable to locate any. In a meeting with Aitken, he was able to persuade him that the harbour was unsafe and that it would be preferable to land at an alternate location about a mile away and out of view of the town. Meanwhile, Aitken had decided that Tanga would be seized that evening and issued orders to that effect.

It was a rather poor reconnaissance on Caufield's part. The area selected for the initial assault was on the southern side of a peninsula known locally as Ras Kasone (see Figure 1). Not having sent anyone ashore to take a closer look, Force 'B' was unaware of the fact that the approach to the beach traversed a thick mangrove swamp, an obstacle that the British and Indian troops would have to wade through on their way to shore.²³

The convoy ran into trouble shortly after Aitken issued his orders. Not famil-

iar with amphibious operations, the ships jostled about and came out of line as they moved towards the beach. Additional time had to be spent re-positioning the transports, and it was not until dusk that the Imperial Service Brigade began unloading their troops into barges and heading towards the landing area. The first to land were the 13th Rajputs, led by Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Stewart. The landing itself was not an easy task. The barges were forced to stop short of the beach, and the troops had to slog their way through the mangrove swamp to land. The scene on the beach was unimpressive to say the least. Troops that had spent close to two weeks crammed aboard the transports were now exhausted and in no condition to fight.

But that is exactly what they had to do now. During the evening, the *Schutztruppe's* 17th Feld Kompanie (17th FK), led by Captain Tafel, had moved from its encampment on the outskirts of town and established a defensive position west of a railway embankment facing the British landing beach. It was against this position that Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart now unknowingly led a half battalion and two machine guns of the 13th Rajputs.

As Stewart and his men moved from the landing beach towards the outskirts of Tanga, the *bundu* (thorn bushes) kept the troops from straying too far into the bush off the lane way. This had the effect

of channeling the troops towards the 17th FK defensive position. As the Indian troops came into range, the Germans and Askaris opened fire, sweeping the ranks of the Rajputs with machine guns and causing a significant number of casualties. The main body of the 13th Rajputs and other elements of the Imperial Service Brigade then moved forward to extricate the forward patrol but met with the same fate. As the officers attempted to rally their men, many threw down their rifles and ran back to the beach. Seeing the enemy in disarray, Captain Tafel ordered his troops to counterattack, a move that routed the Brigade completely. By ten o'clock on the morning of November 3rd, the British had not advanced beyond the beach but had lost three hundred men—mostly officers and non-commissioned officers—in their attempt.

General Aitken seemed unfazed by the failure of the 13th Rajputs and other units of Tighe's Brigade. He simply moved his headquarters ashore at Ras Kasone and began developing a plan of attack for the following day. After receiving an update from Tighe on the morning's activities, Aitken decided that the entire force would be landed to take Tanga. He promptly issued orders for the disembarkation of the Bangalore Brigade and decided that he would personally command the attack at daybreak on the 4th. As the day wore on, though, it became apparent that the problems associated

with the unloading of General Wapshare's troops were enormous. No thought whatsoever had been given to the loading of the boats in Bombay; now it seemed that all of the necessary equipment was difficult to retrieve from the holds of the transports. Aitken became furious as the unloading dragged on throughout the night and into the next morning.

As attention focused on the unloading of the boats, not much was given to the enemy. Consequently, no reconnaissance was carried out during the afternoon or evening of the 3rd. In hindsight it is rather unfortunate, because had Tighe sent patrols into Tanga that afternoon, he would have found the town empty and ripe for the picking. Shortly after the engagement that morning the 17th, FK had withdrawn north out of the town and up the Northern Railway to await reinforcements from New Moshi. Captain Tafel was convinced that the British would employ the 6-inch guns of HMS *Fox* to shell the town, and he believed that remaining there was not in the best interests of his company.²⁴

Meanwhile, von Lettow-Vorbeck had been given ample opportunity to move his *Schutztruppe* companies from New Moshi to the outskirts of Tanga. The 17th FK was joined by the 7th, 8th, 13th and 16th FK. These he used to develop the right flank of his forward positions and provide some depth for

the defence of the town itself. When the Force 'B' attack finally materialized around noon on the 4th, the *Schutztruppe* were ready.

Aitken had determined that Wapshare's Bangalore Brigade, led by the 2nd North Lancashires, would advance on the right, while Tighe's Imperial Service Brigade advanced on the left. Now as the British and Indian troops pressed their attack, the heat and terrain began to take its toll on them. Two and a half hours later, they had only advanced a few hundred yards through the *bundu* and men were beginning to faint from heat exhaustion. At 2:30 the Germans opened fire on the advancing troops and the North Lancs pushed forward on the right flank towards the town. Meanwhile, all hell broke loose on the British left. The Bangalore Brigade, bloodied in the previous day's fighting, crumbled under the well-directed firing of the German Askaris, with many troops refusing to advance and others running for the beach. The efforts by the officers to rally the troops met with little success and many were shot as they attempted to halt and turn their men back towards the enemy.

The British right flank continued to enjoy moderate success as some of the North Lancs and others entered Tanga and began house-to-house fighting in an attempt to secure the town. However, their success was to be short-lived. A call for reinforcements went unanswered as troops not already in Tanga remained dispersed throughout the bush or crowded back to the beach. A call for fire support from HMS *Fox* was answered but resulted in one shell being fired into the hospital and a number more into what remained of the British front line.²⁵ Meanwhile, German opposition within the town stiffened and the North Lancs were soon forced back towards the bridgehead. The fighting then degenerated into small battles as the main body crowded the landing beaches.

Aitken was thoroughly disgusted by the scene unfolding around him. He watched in horror as officers fired on their own troops in an attempt to control them. As if to add insult to injury, the fighting in and around Tanga had upset




Figure 3 - Tanga Town and Surrounding Area

hives of African wild bees, which set upon both attackers and defenders alike, adding further to the confusion.²⁶ As sunset fell on the beaches, the British force remained in a state of confusion. A German counterattack at that crucial moment may have resulted in a massacre. Fortunately for the British, the Germans were in no position to launch one.

It was while surveying the devastation on the beaches that the British heard a German bugle call. Many believed that it was sounding a charge by the *Schutztruppe*, but Meinertzhagen quickly recognized it as the call for the retreat. He advised Aitken and was directed to go forward and investigate the situation. Meinertzhagen returned to Tanga with two men to find that the Germans had deserted the town once more. He quickly returned to the bridgehead, apprised Aitken of what he had found and attempted to convince him to occupy the town with whatever troops they could gather. But Aitken would hear nothing of it. He had seen enough, his mind was made up, and his only desire was to get away from Tanga and cut his losses.²⁷ Orders were issued to re-embark the following morning.

It appears as if the German bugle call was made in error, but it had the effect of withdrawing von Lettow-Vorbeck's troops from Tanga. The German commander later claimed that he had moved out of Tanga for fear of being shelled by HMS *Fox*.²⁸ At any rate, the city remained completely unoccupied throughout the evening of 4th-5th November, and poor weather prevented the Germans from interfering in any significant way with the British withdrawal.

It was soon apparent that plans for re-embarkation had received as little attention as those for disembarkation. The scene of confusion that prevailed on the beaches on the evening of the 4th continued into the following day. Abandoning personal equipment, weapons, machine guns and even the more seriously wounded, the last members of Force 'B' left the shores of East Africa at 3:20 p.m. on the afternoon of November 5th. As the British re-embarked, the Germans moved back into



General von Lettow-Vorbeck, Commander of the German forces in East Africa from 1914 to November 1918. (courtesy National Archives)

Tanga and brought forward their two antiquated artillery pieces in order to take 'pot shots' at the transports. A few of these shots were successful, and one of the transports was set on fire.²⁹

Aitken's last act was to send a group of officers forward to negotiate the transfer of a number of patients from the local hospital to the ships, where they could be better cared for. With this done, Force 'B', led by HMS *Fox*, slinked away from Tanga and steamed back to Mombasa. The operation was an utter disaster for the British, who suffered 817 casualties out of a force of 8,000.³⁰ For

“... plans for re-embarkation had received as little attention as those for disembarkation.”

Aitken it signaled the end of his career. His failure earned him a reduction in rank to colonel, retirement and being placed on half-pay for the remainder of the war. Von Lettow-Vorbeck and his *Schutztruppe* fared better. German casualties amounted to only 16 Europeans

and 48 Askaris out of a force of approximately 1,000. Moreover, the Germans were able to capture enough small arms to equip three more *Schutztruppe* field companies. Also captured were 16 machine guns, over 600,000 rounds of ammunition, field communications equipment and at least a year's supply of clothing and personal equipment.³¹ Moreover, the routing of a numerically superior force at Tanga by his native Askaris did wonders for the moral of the *Schutztruppe*. Finally, the success of von Lettow-Vorbeck's forces against General Stewart's attack on Longido in the north further reinforced morale.

What was learned, then, as a result of Aitken's ill-fated foray at Tanga? Obviously, there was a general lack of knowledge of both the terrain and the enemy amongst the British staff. This fact was demonstrated on numerous occasions, from the initial planning stages straight through to the execution of the assault. What is unconscionable is that when the opportunity to learn more about the enemy and use of information gathering resources were placed at his disposal, Aitken refused the support offered (Graham's offer of a contingent from the KAR), choosing instead to form conclusions based on his own limited knowledge.

The failure at Tanga may also be attributed to a lack of security applied to the operation. By advertising their intentions to the Germans, the British allowed von Lettow-Vorbeck ample opportunity to develop a defensive plan and move troops to Tanga to counter the Force 'B' assault. Had the operation been effected in secrecy, the *Schutztruppe* might have been caught off guard and the British able to gain a foothold in Tanga. The lack of security—which was indirectly a result of a misperception about the strength and capabilities of the *Schutztruppe*—jeopardized the operation from the start and was in large measure responsible for the British defeat.

Although the concept of joint operations was in its infancy, Aitken could have also made much better use of the fire support available from HMS *Fox* in

the execution of his assault. As it was, Caufield appeared ambivalent about the notion of doing anything more than sweeping the harbour of suspected mines. Meinertzhagen noted afterwards in his diary of Caufield:

“He seems nervous, yet pompous, shift-eyed, and not at all inclined to help. It strikes me that he is definitely afraid and is always referring to the safety of his blasted

ship, ignoring the fact that it is his business to protect us even if he loses his ship.”³²

Finally, Aitken’s arrogance, especially vis à vis the capabilities of his own Indian troops versus those of the German Askaris, was another contributing factor to the defeat of Force ‘B’. Had Aitken taken the time to properly assess his own troops’ capabilities and heeded the advice of his staff regarding

those of the Askaris, he may have been more apt to accept Graham’s offer of a unit of the KAR and approached the assault on Tanga in another manner. In short, Aitken’s flawed leadership and poor generalship are what ultimately led to the debacle at Tanga.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Captain Mark Godefroy is an Army intelligence officer with a Bachelor of Military Arts and Science degree from the Royal Military College of Canada. A graduate of the Land Force Command and Staff College and a former artillery officer, his service includes a number of operational tours of duty with air defence artillery units in Canada and overseas. Captain Godefroy is currently serving as G2 Plans at Land Force Western Area Headquarters.

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12. Byron Farwell, *The Great War in Africa 1914-1918* (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1987), pp. 162.
13. Major J.R. Sibley, *Tanganyikan Guerilla - East African Campaign 1914-18* (New York: Ballantine Books Inc., 1971), pp. 26.
14. Ibid, pp. 26.
15. Ibid, pp. 27.
16. Farwell, pp. 163.
17. Ibid, pp. 165.
18. Hoyt, pp. 32-33.
19. Brian Gardner, *German East - The Story of the First World War in East Africa* (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1963), pp. 21.
20. Schnee and his British counterpart, Norman King, had attempted to minimize the impact of the war in East Africa by agreeing to the concept of “open cities” that would remain neutral. However, their views were not shared by their political superiors. Furthermore, their “truces” were certainly not binding, especially after the British incident at Dar es Salaam in early August 1914.
21. Hoyt, pp. 32.
22. Farwell, pp. 167.
23. Hoyt, pp. 36.
24. Gardner, pp. 27.
25. Hoyt, pp. 46.
26. Gardner, pp. 31.
27. Farwell, pp. 174-175.
28. Ibid, pp. 175.
29. Gardner, pp. 33.
30. Ibid, pp. 32. In his book, *East African Campaigns*, von Lettow-Vorbeck claims that British casualties were much higher. According to an English officer that he later spoke to, the figure was closer to 1,500.
31. General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, *East African Campaigns* (New York: Robert Speller and Sons Publishers Inc., 1957), pp. 40.
32. Farwell, pp. 167.

Aboriginal Participation in Canadian Military Service: Historic and Contemporary Contexts

by Mr. John Moses

The aim of this paper is to indicate a spectrum of attitudes as exhibited by status Indian communities and individual Aboriginal persons in Canada in response to perceived challenges and opportunities arising from Canada's involvement in the First and Second World Wars.¹ It is anticipated that a familiarity with Canadian Aboriginal issues will become an added feature in the professional knowledge of Canadian Forces (CF) personnel. This is in view of further likely domestic operations within Canada including provision of Aid to the Civil Power, the continued expansion of Reserve programs such as the Canadian Rangers, current Regular Force recruitment initiatives including the CF Aboriginal Entry Program and the Sergeant Tommy Prince Army Training Initiative. As CF personnel will be dealing with First Nations constituencies within these contexts, it is appropriate they further their knowledge of First Nations socio-political and historical issues pertaining to military affairs in Canada.

Aboriginal communities across many parts of Canada have a tradition of military service in support of the Crown during conflict and war. However, this service has never been unconditional, nor without complication or controversy for those First Nations individuals and communities concerned. For status Indian people in Canada, the question of participation or non-participation in the two World Wars was divisive within Indian reserve communities and in some cases among individual families. The legacies of these divisions continue to be felt in some communities today.

A detailed history of Aboriginal/European relations is beyond the

scope of this paper. However, initial periods of First Nations/European contact across what is now eastern North America may be characterised in terms approaching relative equality. During peacetime the European powers involved (prior to 1664, the English, French and Dutch) were interested in maintaining the co-operation of their First Nations counterparts in pursuit of joint economic projects, principally those involving the fur trade, the success of which was largely dependent upon indigenous labour. In wartime, these same powers sought to secure the active support of their First Nations opposites as military allies, or to secure from them guarantees of neutrality.

Throughout this period, known historically as the era of the *peace and friendship treaties*, issues of land cession and surrender were typically not a feature of negotiations entered into between First Nations and imperial or colonial governments. For example, a peace & friendship treaty signed on March 10, 1760 provides the historical basis upon which the controversial decision in the *Marshall Aboriginal* fishing rights case rests. It was negotiated between the Crown and Mi'kmaq leadership, during the several months following the fall of the French at Louisbourg (June 1759) and Quebec (September 1759). This was fully three years in advance of the final cessation of hostilities between the English and the French with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763. This particular treaty thus came into being during a time in which the Crown was actively courting the

favour of the Mi'kmaq, who were previously allied with the French. This treaty's context was very much one of mutual advantage and conciliation between Mi'kmaq and Crown interests, precisely at a time when the British were attempting to consolidate and entrench their hegemony across the Maritimes.

In the absence of such alliances particular coalitions of First Nations, acting under astute political and military leadership (often combined in the person of a single charismatic individual), were

"Aboriginal communities across many parts of Canada have a tradition of military service in support of the Crown during conflict and war."

prepared to orchestrate events so that new circumstances more agreeable to their own immediate interests might be secured. Pontiac, an Odawa war leader formerly aligned with the French, united numerous First Nations to wage guerrilla war against British-held posts across the eastern Great Lakes region and the Ohio River valley throughout the summer and autumn of 1763. This was in the immediate aftermath of the demise of the regime of New France when the Treaty of Paris was signed. It was becoming clear to those First Nations previously aligned with the French, that the British did not intend to assume the same relatively liberal approach to First Nations trade and sovereignty issues that the French had pursued. Pontiac's actions in consequence were partly responsible for the British implementation of the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763 by

which the Crown sought *inter alia* to establish a policy mechanism, whereby a formalised system of negotiating land transactions between First Nations, interests and Crown authority might be established.

The Royal Proclamation remains foundational to any discussion of Aboriginal rights, land claims, and the Aboriginal law of Canada. The late Bora Laskin, former chief justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, described its significance most dramatically when he wrote, *"This Proclamation was an Executive Order having the force and effect of an Act of Parliament and was described ... as the 'Indian Bill of Rights'. Its force as a statute is analogous to the status of Magna Carta ..."*² The Royal Proclamation meanwhile has been constitutionally enshrined by virtue of its reference in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms at section 25, within the Constitution Act, 1982. Thus its impact continues to be felt to this day, representing to some First Nations the Crown's historic recognition of their status as sovereign independent nations. In Canadian courts it represents acknowledgement of Canada's fiduciary obligations and special trust relationship toward First Nations interests as the British Crown's modern successor in North America.

Thus from the mid-17th through early 19th centuries successive military alliances of particular First Nations with their respective European and colonial counterparts played a role in determining a balance of power. This would ultimately result in the formation and subsequent development of the modern Canadian and American nation-states as they exist today. Throughout this era what essentially were First Nations' armies under First Nations' leadership, could be mobilized to serve alongside European and colonial allies in the field in pursuit of joint military-strategic objectives. In the absence of such alliances, First Nations were - for a period of time - capable of prosecuting total



A Micmac warrior around 1740. Natives successfully halted the first European attempts to establish colonies in North America. Once permanent colonies were established, alliances with Natives proved decisive to the outcome of wars fought between the various colonies. Hopes of establishing a permanent Native homeland ended following the War of 1812. (courtesy Parks Canada)

warfare or warfare with limited objectives on their own behalf.

Strategic alliances, however, between European-colonial powers, and First Nations acting under charismatic indigenous leadership, were more common. The Mohawk war captain Thayendanegea or Joseph Brant was a staunch ally to the British throughout the American Revolution and beyond. The Shawnee leader Tecumseh organized and led a broad coalition of First Nations forces who fought alongside the British against the Americans during the War of 1812. John Norton, Joseph Brant's own chosen successor at the Six Nations of the Grand River territory, led guerrilla bands and irregular forces of Grand River warriors across the Detroit and Niagara frontiers alongside the British throughout 1812-1814.

It is significant that from 1755 until 1830, a branch of the British Army known as the Indian Department was responsible for the Crown's administration of Indian affairs in North America. The support of the First Nations across eastern North America was no longer required in various endeavours as it once had been, whether in military or economic terms. This was because of the resolution across North America of successive power struggles between various imperial regimes and their successor states. The diminishment of the fur trade as a foundation of the North American economy and with enormous Aboriginal population declines concomitant with exponential increases in European immigration also contributed. In effect First Nations had ceased being regarded as potential military allies or trade partners and increasingly were seen as economic liabilities and as impediments to territorial development and expansion. By 1830 the administration of Indian affairs in British North America passed from military control to civil authority.

It was at this time that the assimilation of Aboriginal populations (entailing their Christian religious conversion and elimination of distinctive cultural patterns), and the attainment of First Nations lands, became the objective of colonial and subsequently dominion Indian policy. In a departure from the former practice of negotiating *peace & friendship treaties*, a new policy of concluding *land cession & surrender treaties* was initiated. This new policy approach was formalised in present-day Ontario as early as 1850 with the negotiation of the Robinson-Huron and Robinson-Superior Treaties that year. West of the Great Lakes it was entrenched by 1871, and from 1871 through 1921 Numbered Treaties 1 to 11 were concluded across the present-day prairie provinces, much of the Yukon and North West Territories (NWT). These treaties typically provided for the cession and surrender of First Nations traditional territories and hunting grounds in exchange for promises

of reserved lands and the payment of certain considerations, either as lump-sum monetary payments or in other cases as fixed annuities.

With the coming of Confederation, section 91(24) of the Constitution Act 1867, provided the federal level of government with authority over “.... Indians and lands Reserved for Indians ...” This federal authority was codified in 1876 with the passage of the first consolidated Indian Act. Prior to this time separate pieces of colonial legislation provided a policy framework for the administration of Indian affairs within the respective provinces. The notion of “Indian status” was first introduced in Lower Canada (Canada East) as early as 1850, with the passage of “An Act ... for the better protection of the Land and Property of Indians in Lower Canada”. This Act contained the first legal definition of who was to be considered an “Indian” from the perspective of government.

By the mid-19th century the fortunes and prospects of First Nations communities across the central and eastern portions of British North America had changed dramatically. No longer in a position during time of conflict to mobilise under their own indigenous leadership. By the dawn of the 20th century First Nations persons resolving to demonstrate their communities’ continuing allegiance to Crown military authority were compelled to do so through enlistment as individual service personnel, in the armed forces of the Canadian dominion.

In socio-political terms as well as military affairs First Nations pursued different courses of action in response to the challenges and opportunities posed by the realities of armed conflict. These courses of action differed what ever the government, whether it was European, colonial or national. These ranged from that historical era during which the various European and colonial powers actively courted the assistance of particular First Nations as full allies in pursuit of joint military-strategic objectives, to the modern wars of the 20th century. In either instance, while many Aboriginal persons – both women and men – made collective or individual decisions to sup-

port the warfighting efforts, either through activities on the home front or as warrior participants. Other communities and individuals espoused carefully reasoned arguments in justification of their stances of neutrality or non-involvement.

During both World Wars the Crown considered all Aboriginal people in Canada as British subjects, the ambiguity of their actual citizenship status within the Canadian dominion notwithstanding.⁴ However, some First Nations maintained that prior treaties or other agreements with the Crown, and the force and effect of the federal Indian Act legislation of the era, combined to exempt their band members from compulsory military duty. Others felt that their voluntary participation in the war effort would enhance their claims toward full citizenship and legal equality in Canada in peacetime. In any event the more draconian aspects of the Indian Act, including bans on political organization, traditional spirituality, and restrictions concerning off-reservation travel were removed by 1951. The legal right to vote without penalty in federal elections was ultimately extended to all status Indians in Canada in 1960.

During the First World War the leadership of particular First Nations communities objected to the activities of recruiters on reserve lands and opposed the attempted conscription of band members under the Military Service Act of 1917.⁵ During the Second World War, the political organization le Comité de Protection, operating out of the Huron reserve near Quebec City maintained that Indians were exempt from service



David Greyeyes, a grain farmer from Saskatchewan, served with The Saskatoon Light Infantry (M.G.) in Sicily, Italy, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Following the war Greyeyes was Chief of the Muskeg Lake Band and a Regional Director for the Department of Indian Affairs. In 1977, he was appointed to the Saskatchewan Sports Hall of Fame and a Member of the Order of Canada. (courtesy Department of Veterans Affairs)

under the wartime National Resources Mobilization Act. This was by virtue of their inferior citizenship status under the Indian Act, and in view of their sovereignty as they inferred it from their interpretation of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Other communities in northern Ontario claimed similar exemptions under the 1850 Robinson-Huron and Robinson-Superior Treaties.⁶

Of those who did participate in 20th century war efforts, the service records of many First Nations individuals and Indian reserve communities are impressive. By the closing months of the Second World War (i.e. January, 1945) the Indian Affairs branch issued a directive exempting prairie and northern status Indians covered by Treaties 3, 6, 8

and 11 from overseas service. However, by this relatively late date in the conflict no fewer than 324 men from the various bands signatory to these treaties had already enlisted.⁷ Oral testimony from the Golden Lake Reserve in eastern Ontario maintains that of the reserve's entire able-bodied male population eligible for service during the Second World War, all but three volunteered for duty.

The First World War record of the Six Nations of the Grand River Reserve near Brantford, Ontario is likewise notable. Of a total reserve population of approximately 4,500 in 1914, 292 men and 1 woman (a nurse with the Army Nurse Corps of the American Expeditionary Force) voluntarily enlisted for duty overseas. The majority of these were posted to the largely status Indian 107th and 114th Battalions of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Of these, 29 were killed in action, 5 died of wounds or illness, one became a prisoner of war, and one was reported missing.⁸ These figures notwithstanding, the issue as to whether or not band members would participate in the war effort was divisive within the community, and indeed the political legacy, and ramifications of individual and family decisions taken to serve during 1914-1918, are felt to this day.

The experiences of individual First Nations servicemen and women during their recruitment and upon their release varied greatly. As indicated above, during the First World War at least two battalions of the Canadian Expeditionary Force were raised largely among status Indian communities.⁹ During the Second World War, both the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) for the first part of the conflict maintained racially based recruitment policies. Although these were removed from both branches by 1943, they had the net effect of placing (with exceptions) the majority of Aboriginal volunteers in the Army.¹⁰ Confusions during the Second World War, both on the part

of Indian Affairs officials and service recruiters, as to the implications of the Indian Act for potential status Indian volunteers further complicated matters.

In some instances status Indian vol-



Brigadier Oliver Martin was a Mohawk Indian whose military service began in 1909, spanning two world wars. During the First World War, he served with the 107th and 114th Battalions and later joined the Royal Flying Corps where he earned his pilot's wings. After the war, Martin remained with the Militia, becoming Commanding Officer of The Haldimand Rifles (disbanded 1936). During the Second World War, Martin commanded several training brigades in Canada. After the war he became the first native to be appointed provincial magistrate in Ontario. He died in 1957. (Courtesy Department of Veteran's Affairs)

unteers were told they could not be commissioned or even enlist and still hold legal status as Indians under the Indian Act. In other instances upon their return to Canada, newly repatriated Indian veterans were told that because of their ambiguous citizenship and legal status under the Act, they were ineligible to receive veteran's benefits. In order to apply they would have to renounce their Indian status. In yet other instances veterans returned home to find that in

their absence their regional Indian agents had arbitrarily removed their names from their Indian reserve band lists. In some cases after the First World War, agricultural lands were made available for farming by veterans under the terms of the Soldier Settlement Act, but at the expense of expropriating the land from Indian reserve allotments. Similar problems were encountered post-Second World War in relation to the Veterans' Land Act.¹¹ During the Second World War, the federal government for use as military training and proving grounds expropriated Indian reserve lands.

These issues aside, as a function of their wartime and overseas service, many Aboriginal people had the experience of leaving their home communities for the first time in their lives and encountering not only non-Aboriginal people, but also other Aboriginals from other areas of the country. Often friendships formed with other Aboriginals while in training and overseas were instrumental after the Wars in facilitating the organization of some of the first Aboriginal political organizations. Approximately 4000 status Indians (and an unrecorded number of Metis, non-status and Inuit) volunteered for service during the First World War. Status Indian enlistments for the Second World War are recorded at 3090.¹² In 1919 newly returned Mohawk war veteran Fred Loft, from the Six Nations Reserve, founded the first national Aboriginal political organization in Canada, the League of Indians of Canada. In 1927, partly in response to the activism exhibited by organizations such as the League of

Indians of Canada, amendments to the federal Indian Act made it illegal for status Indians to organize politically, or to retain legal counsel in pursuit of claims against the government. Similar to the bans on traditional spiritual activity, such restrictions were to remain in force until 1951.

There is research to indicate that in both World Wars Aboriginal Canadians volunteered for military service in pro-

portionally greater numbers than the rest of the Canadian population at large. Aboriginal veterans and their supporters were vocal in demanding an improved situation for themselves and their communities in post-war Canadian society. After having fought overseas to defend the human rights and sovereignty of Allied nations abroad, Aboriginal veterans, their families and their communities began to question with renewed vigour their own inferior citizenship and legal status within Canada. When the United Nations *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* was proclaimed in 1948, many of its provisions could not be said to apply to Aboriginal peoples in Canada.

From 1946 through 1948 the "Special Parliamentary Committee on Postwar Reconstruction and Re-establishment" and "Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act" heard submis-

"Many returned veterans assumed leadership roles within their own communities. . ."

sions from many status Indian persons and organizations, including Indian veterans.¹³ Such committees and increasing media exposure helped focus public attention on the circumstances of Aboriginal peoples in Canada in the post-war era. Many returned veterans assumed leadership roles within their own communities or within the fledgling Aboriginal political organizations. Some pursued opportunities within the public service.

From the mid-1940's to the present, Aboriginal Canadian political, cultural and social activists and leaders have been at the forefront of challenging the Canadian status quo relative to the treatment of Aboriginal peoples in this country in ways that have directly con-

tributed to developments and refinements within our legal system. Many of the veterans were and still are social activists and leaders. These have advanced our understanding of civil and human rights, and have resulted in a more pluralistic and democratic social fabric and civil society from which all Canadian have benefited, and who have contributed to Canada's profile and reputation abroad. It is significant that within Aboriginal communities today, whether on November 11 or otherwise, when homage is paid to surviving veterans and the fallen, the emphasis is not so much upon the fact of their overseas service and sacrifice, as upon their contributions within their respective communities at home.¹⁴



More on this subject will appear in a future issue.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Mr. John Moses is a Native History Researcher with the Canadian Ethnology Service at the Canadian Museum of Civilization in Hull, QC. He holds a diploma of applied arts in museum technology and is currently completing a BA (Honours) degree in Aboriginal studies at the Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies at Carleton University in Ottawa. He has worked and trained previously at the British Museum and the Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of the American Indian. His CF Regular Force experience in the 1980's included postings as a Communicator Research Operator 291 to CFS Leitrim and CFS Alert.

ENDNOTES

1. Terminology: In this paper *Aboriginal* is used as per its definition under the Constitution Act 1982 s. 35 as an inclusive term identifying the Indian, Inuit and Metis populations of Canada. *Indian* continues in legal usage insofar as there remains in force the federal legislation of the Indian Act and the continuing mandate of the federal Department of Indian and Northern Affairs. *Indian* also remains in use within significant Aboriginal constituencies themselves, notably across the Prairie Provinces, as with the Saskatchewan Indian Federated College and the Indian Association of Alberta. *First Nations* is used as a more contemporary equivalent (dating from 1980) identifying status Indians (and their ancestral populations), especially those communities of status Indians residing on Indian reserves, who are the principal participants in current comprehensive land claims negotiations and litigation presently before

the courts. *Status Indians* are those Aboriginal persons who are legally recognized as *Indians* within the meaning of the *Indian Act*.

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3. Leslie, John, "The Bagot Commission: Developing a Corporate Memory for the Indian Department", *Historical Papers: A Selection from the Papers Presented at the Annual Meeting Held at Ottawa, 1982*, Ottawa: 1982, p. 51.

4. Stevenson, Michael D., "The Mobilisation of Native Canadians During the Second World War", *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 1996*, New Series, Vol. 7, pp. 210-211.

5. St.G. Walker, James W., "Race and Recruitment in World War One: Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force", *Canadian Historical Review*, LXX, 1, 1989, p. 16.

6. Stevenson, "Mobilisation of Native Canadians", pp. 208-211.

7. Ibid. p. 224.

8. Weaver, Sally M., "The Iroquois: The Grand River Reserve in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 1875-1945" in Rogers, Edward S. and Donald B. Smith, Eds. *Aboriginal Ontario: Historical Perspectives on the First Nations*, Toronto: Dundurn Press Ltd., 1994, p. 246.

9. Walker, St.G. James, "Race and Recruitment in World War One", p. 14.

10. Sheffield, R. Scott, "Of Pure European Descent and of the White Race: Recruitment Policy and Aboriginal Canadians, 1939-1945", *Canadian Military History*, Vol. 5, No. 1, spring 1996, pp. 10-11.

11. The Senate of Canada, *The Aboriginal Soldier After the Wars: Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples*, the Hon. Raynell Andreychuk, Chair and the Hon. Len Marchand, Deputy Chair, Ottawa: The Senate of Canada, 1995, p. 17.

12. Ibid. p. 3.

13. Stevenson, "Mobilisation of Native Canadians", p. 226.

14. Carlson, Keith Thor, Ed., *You Are Asked to Witness: The Sto:lo in Canada's Pacific Coast History*, Chilliwack: Sto:lo Heritage Trust, 1997, p. 137.

Which Way to the Beach?

The Case for "Amphibiosity"

by Major Peter J. Williams, CD

INTRODUCTION

The purists amongst you won't find the "A" word in the dictionary, but hopefully you've got the idea. If not, then consider this:

*Hey Diddle-de-dee; Amphibiosity.
If a crisis arises in Timbuctoo
And a Minister asks what can we do,
It's a helluva lot-in a month or two.
Hey diddle-de-dee.*

*Hey diddle-de-dee. Where is our L.P.D.?!
In Curaçao on a training cruise.
Then call her back, there's no time to lose
If our bootnecks² skills we want to use.
Hey diddle-de-dee.*

*Hey diddle-de-dee, high capability.
If a coup d'état occurs today
On the other side of Bengal Bay
By mid-July we'll be on our way
With Amphibiosity!³*

The appointment of a Canadian general officer as the Assistant Deputy Commanding General of III (US) Corps in Fort Hood, Texas, is a sure sign as any that our doctrine is taking a southern focus, and with a US Army (USA) flavour in particular. Bearing in mind the characteristics of the United States Army as compared to our own and the kinds of tasks our Army has performed in the past (which our government seems quite happy for us to execute in future), are we aligning ourselves with the right branch of the US armed services? Shouldn't we focus more effort on co-operating with another branch of the American services with whom we, as an Army, have more in common, and whose doctrinal focus is a truer reflection of what are likely to be our national interests of the future: the United States Marine Corps (USMC)? Indeed, the purpose of this paper is to argue that the Canadian Forces (CF) as a whole could benefit more from closer

affiliation with the USMC, than the Canadian Army could with just the USA.

Since 1968 our forces have been integrated and have an innate sense of "jointness," which is evident even at unit level. A gunshot wound is still a gunshot wound, whether it is seen to by a doctor who last served on board ship, an airbase or in a brigade group. An IMP is still an IMP, whether delivered by a supply technician who wears navy blue or army green. At formation and higher levels we have formed a deployable joint force headquarters based on the old 1st Canadian Division and the J staff at National Defense Headquarters (NDHQ).

The USMC, according to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) definition, (though ironically not American⁴), is inherently integrated by nature, composed as it is of Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) normally deployed from the sea.⁵ We in the CF also share a number of weapons platforms with the USMC, a great aid to interoperability now that coalition operations are the watchword. Finally, at the risk of being jingoistic, I would even say that we are also *Few and Proud*.

WHERE ARE WE NOW?

For many years our doctrine was geared toward high intensity conflict in Central Europe. Even with the disbanding of Canadian Forces Europe (CFE) and its constituent formations, the sense of land based power projection as the measure of our warfighting skill still pervades our military thought. Wars and operations short of them are still fought entirely on land, ultimately in a Kursk-like scenario. Our doctrinal publications state that:

Joint and combined operations will revolve around the efficient integration of all elements of combat power *including naval and air*

forces (my italics) to achieve operational objectives leading to the desired end state.⁶

Yet, as one may search throughout the above document, little or no mention is made of how our Army can play its part in future joint operations. It was even more startling to realise that while we do have a publication dealing with jungle warfare, we have none concerning amphibious operations. While we may be advocates of integration, in terms of force projection and the Army, we appear to be somewhat "Hercbound," rather than thinking ahead to world-wide deployability once the C-130 is past its useful (and perhaps, safe?) shelf life. Witness this excerpt from our capstone Army publication—B-GL-300-000/FP-000 *Canada's Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee*—which states that, our ground forces:

...must possess or have access to tactical, operational and strategic mobility. This includes maintaining at high readiness in conjunction with designated elements of the air force, a parachute and air-portable delivery means for troops and equipment.⁷

Despite the fall of the Berlin Wall some ten years ago our training seems to be solely based on fighting a Cold War enemy. While this paper will not argue with the assumption we have made that training for high intensity conflict is the best preparation for the spectrum of operations, might we be putting all our eggs in the wrong basket? Or more simply put, is what may be good for the USA necessarily good for us? I am not so sure it is.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

While victory in the Gulf and Cold Wars did not bring about the "New World Order" envisaged by some,

few can argue that the world is a much different place than that experienced by 4 Canadian Mechanised Brigade Group (4 CMBG) veterans. We are now more rightly concerned about what have been termed asymmetric threats from previously ignored (but nonetheless present) quarters. The 1997 US Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) envisages a future characterised by:

... crisis, conflict and chaos in the littorals brought upon by rapid economic growth, increased competition for limited resources, terrorism, technological diffusion, exponential growth in urban populations, nationalism, ethnic and religious strife and increasing access to modern conventional weaponry and weapons of mass destruction.⁸

WHERE ARE WE GOING?

So what could the above examples mean for our foreign and defence policy? Some might argue that our (lead role) in the intervention in Rwanda was driven in part by the fact that the nation involved was a fellow member of La Francophonie. Though it is not possible to buy a Cuban cigar legally in America, the protests made by the Cuban community throughout the United States over the fate of a young boy washed ashore in Florida have frustrated attempts by even the powerful US Department of Justice, to resolve the matter expeditiously. Though this interest group has yet to bring about a reversal of US policy toward Cuba, the long standing military relationship between Israel and the United States (or ostensible American support for the Irish Republican Army) is difficult to dismiss as being partly based on ethnic grounds.

Indeed, foreign and defence policy, as is the case with all government policies, will continue to be influenced by national character and ethnic make up as much as anything else. In this light, both our foreign and defence policies will likely take a more Pacific Rim focus than the Eurocentric flavour it may have had in the past. Indeed, it may have already begun to do so: Japan continues to be one of our largest trading partners outside the United States and the pres-

ent government has already led more Team Canada trade delegations to the Asian region than it has to Europe. Though our historic ties may lie with Europe for many of us, our future seems to lie to the west. The Pacific region and the area of the South China Sea in particular is highly strategic, in that it hosts the busiest shipping and air lanes in the

“... the sense of land-based power projection as the measure of our warfighting skill still pervades our military thought.”

world, as well as a significant portion of the world's remaining oil reserves.⁹ It is an area that Canada can ill afford to ignore, and one in which joint forces will prove to be most effective.

In terms of defence policy, then I would submit that in a foreign policy arena where the Pacific region is our focus, naval force power projection, and hence amphibiousity will dominate our defence policies in the future. The Army must start preparing now for this future. Closer ties with the USMC will go along way toward achieving this end-state.

THE US ARMY

Geared to fight its nation's wars, the USA trains to fight at a weight above our own capabilities. This is not to denigrate the state of our own Army, but more a reflection of true reality. USA training is dominated by meeting the unforgiving testing ground of the National Training Centre (NTC), in the Mojave Desert in high intensity scenarios. It is also suggested that the USA view peacekeeping operations or Operations Other Than War (OOTW) as distractions from their intended role of warfighting, while these continue to be our focus as we train more for medium intensity operations. To be fair, the USA has recently decided to enter the medium level forces arena, proposing to stand up two medium brigades, with both formations fully equipped by 30 September 2001.¹⁰ It is also cause for optimism (at least for Canadian indus-

try) that for initial equipment trials of the Light Armoured Vehicle (LAVs), built by General Motors Diesel Division Canada, are being used. As far as equipments are concerned, we do share some: the rifle, the M-113, the M-109, (though the second we will phase out,) and the Crusader which will outgun the latter.

As determined as the current US Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, is to radically transform the service into a lighter more deployable force however, lack of funding and questions from Congress members as to the necessity for such change, threatens to delay his vision.¹¹

THE USMC

One could argue that we in the CF share more with the USMC than we do with the USA. Our Army will soon be mostly LAV-based, as are USMC recon units already. Our Army focuses at the battlegroup level, as does the USMC with their Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs)¹², which are built around a reinforced infantry battalion. These MEUs, deployed aboard three to four ship Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs), are routinely teamed with aircraft carrier battle groups (CV BGs), within which Canadian warships have operated¹³, making them truly joint in nature. In the air our pilots use the same platform, though the USMC are able to fly their F-18s from the decks of aircraft carriers.¹⁴ Most importantly at the CF level, we share an innate sense of integration, and one beyond that of the USA.

At least one American commentator has also noted that, “the Marine Corps seems much better adapted to rapid deployment”¹⁵, than the Army, and cites the forward deployed ARGs, and Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPSS) as examples of this. The same author also makes the astute observation, that as the USMC own their own aircraft, they may be better placed than the Army to operate as a truly effective lightweight force.¹⁶

While it is understood that the US Army will fight their nation's wars, the

USMC retains the role of the so-called “911 Force”, responsible to “kick the door in” in the first place. Sustainment of Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) beyond 30 days is a problem at present, but with maturation of Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea (OMFTS) and sea based logistics, MAGTFs of the future will have more staying power.

USMC DOCTRINE

The USMC have determined that 70% of the world’s population lives within 200 miles of the seas and that 80% of the world’s capitals lie within 300 miles of a coastline.¹⁷ The USMC, in concert with the US Navy (USN), which receives the lion’s share of the annual US defence budget¹⁸, are now dedicating increasing attention to the area of the world known as the littorals, which they define as:

Those regions relating to or existing on a shore or coastline within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of naval expeditionary forces.¹⁹

From the realisation of where the world’s population is concentrated they have further devoted attention to what they see as the typical conflicts of the future, which they are naming “The Three Block War”. In recognition of the fact that the public demands, indeed expects, future conflict to have no casualties, the USMC has taken on the role of proponent service for Non-Lethal Weapons.

NAVAL POWER PROJECTION AND OPERATIONAL MANEUVER (SIC) FROM THE SEA

Naval and sea based forces possess several advantages over purely land based ones. The former require no permission to enter an area of impending crisis, there are no sovereignty issues involved in their deployment, they can be sustained at sea for long periods of time, and are less vulnerable than land based forces. Their mere presence can often resolve a crisis.

From a realisation of where the world’s population centres are, the types of conflicts envisaged in the future, and

the unique characteristics of naval forces, the USMC concluded that:

In the absence of an adjacent land base, a sustainable forcible entry capability that is independent of forward staging bases, friendly borders, overflight rights and other politically dependent support, *can only come from the sea.*²⁰

Thus was born the concept of OMFTS. Its aim is to increase the mobility and combat of MAGTFs, while reducing its footprint ashore. OMFTS has three main tenets:

- Sea bases.
- Rapid maneuver (sic) from over the horizon.
- Reduced footprint ashore.²¹

“... amphibiosity will dominate our defence policy in the future.”

What is envisaged in OMFTS is not a costly Dieppe or Tarawa, but rather a manoeuvrist Inchon. The overall aim is to increase the mobility and combat power of the MAGTF, while reducing its logistical footprint ashore. It seeks to avoid a frontal assault, and to replace it with manoeuvre against enemy weaknesses. It involves moving directly inland without stopping at a beach, thus avoiding the pause, which has resulted in the likes of Anzio and Gallipoli.²²

Fire support is one of the aspects of OMFTS that is a truly joint one, consisting as it does of naval surface/subsurface, aviation and ground based fires. All systems will be sustained from the sea, but, “...will be capable of providing a range of effects appropriate to the situation... from devastating lethal fires in sustained operations ashore (SOA) to tailored non lethal fires in support of other expeditionary operations (OEO).”²³

Indeed the USMC and the US Navy are putting their money where their mouth is. In order to meet the demands

of OMFTS, the USMC has designated the MV-22 Osprey Tiltrotor aircraft as one of its top equipment priorities. This Vertical Short Take-Off and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft can take off and land like a helicopter and fly like a normal fixed wing airplane. It can carry 24 fully equipped troops or 10,000 kg of external load from a sea based vessel, or a land base, at twice the speed of a conventional helicopter. Its normal range is 954km and with in-flight refuelling it can extend to 3892 km, thereby putting it within reach of any worldwide crisis area.²⁴ Put simply, the Osprey can self deploy anywhere in the world without the need for strategic airlift or sealift. An MV-22 test pilot recently commented on the Tiltrotor aircraft that, “Its going to change the way we do business... its going to get rid of the word ‘beach’ from our vocabulary.”²⁵

The USMC sea bases of the future will be the amphibious ships of the Landing Platform Dock (LPD-17) Class. These new vessels will replace several older types of vessel, and will be able to carry 700 troops, four Osprey, and twice the cargo and ammunition of the ships it will replace.²⁶

This is not a doctrine without risk however, and the increasing attention devoted by the US Navy to Mine Countermeasures (MCMs) is tactic recognition of this.²⁷ Logistics will also be a critical element of any OMFTS scenario, particularly as ground units will be sustained primarily from sea bases. What is envisaged here is a move from the traditional material intensive approaches of the past, toward a more responsive and flexible logistic pull system. Technology will be used to decrease consumption, while increasing the lethality of our weapons systems.²⁸

KEEPING UP WITH THE JONESES

The US are not the only forces to be devoting increased attention to “amphibiosity”. The UK in its Strategic Defence Review, had as one of its seven major modernisation schemes as:

...providing the Royal Navy with two large aircraft carriers, and a new carrier-borne aircraft, an extension of our capability to fire

Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) from submarines, a new 200-bed hospital ship, and in addition to amphibious ships already on order, a further four roll-on, roll-off (RoRo) transport ships.²⁹

To upgrade its amphibious capability the Royal Navy (RN) commissioned HMS *Ocean* in September 1998. The primary role of the ship is to carry an embarked military force (a maximum of

"One of the first steps . . . should be the purchase of some of the US Navy's amphibious assault ships. . ."

800 troops), supported by 12 medium support helicopters.³⁰ Routinely it carries a Royal Marines Commando (of battalion strength) and its affiliated gun battery.

The Royal Australian Navy has also further increased its amphibious capability through the purchase of two retired US Navy tank landing ships, thus giving it the capability to embark, deploy, lodge and sustain a battalion group.³¹ These ships can carry 450 troops and equipment, medical facilities, and four Black Hawk or three Sea King helicopters. Isn't it time we jumped on board as well?

THE WAY AHEAD

So what does this mean for the Army? I am not advocating that we turn ourselves into a Royal Canadian Marine Corps, but rather that we add the ability to execute OMFTS operations to our bag of tricks, a capability we do not currently possess. Based on a realisation of where the world's population lies, the nature of future conflict, the direction our foreign policy is likely to take, and the inherent integration of the CF, "amphibiosity" makes sense. Such a capability also has application for the deployment of our Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), and will also contribute to our commitments as a

member of the Organisation of American States (OAS).

Our ties with the US will continue, not least of all in the defence sphere. Late last year it was reported that:

Canada will synchronise its defence export laws with the USA, creating a seamless and formal North American defence sales bloc, under an in-principle agreement that will exempt Canada from US export regulations and provide Canadian companies better access to US contracts.³²

One of the first steps in this regard should be the purchase of some of the US Navy's amphibious assault ships, which the LPD-17 Class mentioned earlier, will replace. With this we will have the means to physically embark a ground force. To those who say that in so doing we will be buying a bunch of "rust buckets", I point to the example of the Second World War German Army (whose accomplishments are regularly touted in this journal). Before the war, to perfect their doctrine they practised armoured tactics by using civilian vehicles with wooden frames placed over them to give the appearance of a tank.

This purchase should not prove problematic for our Senior Service who have amply demonstrated their acquisition acumen, through the purchase of four ex-Royal Navy *Upholder* Class submarines, at a time when such craft appear anachronistic. At the same time let us not forget that these vessels are capable of firing the TLAM, a truly joint

fire support capability, that the Army of the future should welcome.

Ships alone will not give us the amphibious capability we need. A whole host of equipment, doctrine and training issues need to be faced as well. In many ways we find ourselves in the same position of the USMC of the 1920s. It was then that a group of visionary officers were able to envisage the need for the US to develop an amphibious doctrine. It was to be another 20 years before it was perfected and put into practice in the Pacific campaign. Measures such as the attendance of Canadian officers at the USMC Amphibious Warfare School, the establishment of Liaison Officer positions on MAGTF staffs, and participation in USMC exercises will further assist us in our journey toward "amphibiosity".

CONCLUSION

Combined and particularly joint operations are the way of the future. As an organization, the CF is inherently more united than that of many other militaries in the world and we must capitalise on this. Amphibious forces are the epitome of being united, and in a world where the littorals are gaining prominence, they make logical sense for Canada from a defence and foreign policy point of view. While closer ties with an organisation such as the US Army will bring benefits, we are in many ways close to USMC in our focus and equipment, and should refine our doctrine accordingly. Anchors aweigh!



ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Major Williams is the Canadian Exchange Officer at the Royal School of Artillery in the United Kingdom. His previous appointment was as the Commander of D Battery, 2 RCHA Petawawa. His service includes tours with the Royal Canadian Artillery School, 2 RCHA, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission, the United Nations Force in Cyprus and NATO's Stabilisation Force in Bosnia. He holds a BA (Honours) from the Royal Military College of Canada and an MA from the Open University in the United Kingdom. His next appointment is as the Chief Instructor in Gunnery at the Royal Canadian Artillery School.

ENDNOTES

1. Landing Platform Dock-HMS *Fearless* and HMS *Intrepid*.
2. Nickname for the British Royal Marines.
3. Michael Clapp and Ewen Southby-Tailyour, *Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle of San Carlos Water* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), p. 288. This poem was actually written by the Royal Navy's Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Operations) in late 1981, in response to "robust" message traffic between the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines on the subject of you-know-what!
4. The USMC, though a separate *service* (author's italics) of the US military, falls under the Department of the Navy, and as such does not meet the American definition of a "Joint" force. By NATO standards, in which operations involving more than one service of the same nation is considered Joint, the USMC is indeed "purple". It is this definition which shall be used throughout this paper.
5. A MAGTF includes infantry, armour, artillery, engineers, combat service support, reconnaissance, aviation and medical elements. It is composed of an HQ Element, a Ground Combat Element (GCE), an Air Combat Element (ACE, made up of fixed and rotary wing aircraft), and a Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). Its roles include: forcible entry onto a hostile shore, crisis response, presence, alliance support/reinforcement, stability operations, counter narcotic operations, security assistance, and humanitarian assistance. From Lt Col H.T. Hayden (Ed), *Warfighting: Maneuver (sic) Warfare in the US Marine Corps* (London: Greenhill Books, 1995), p. 189.
6. *Canada's Army: We Stand on Guard For Thee* (Ottawa: DGPA Creative Services, 1998), p. 117.
7. Canada's Army, p. 93
8. National Defense (sic) Panel, *Quadrennial Defence Review* (Washington: 1997), p. 16.
9. Captain Anton Nugroho, "The Dragon Looks South" *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 2000, p. 74. This article notes somewhat ominously that since 1993, China has had to import oil, in order to meet energy needs. Unless China finds reserves at home, it will need to import 100 million tons of oil per year by 2020. The reserves of the South China Sea therefore take on increased significance.
10. Scott Gourley, "US Army Releases Medium Brigade Draft", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 12 January 2000, p. 5.
11. Andrew Koch, "Transformation at a Price", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 22 March 2000, p. 21.
12. Normally the USMC had seven deployable. MEUs. Three each based on the East and West coasts of the US, and one in Japan. These can be tasked worldwide, and in 1998 an MEU in the Adriatic Sea was the Strategic Reserve for the Commander of NATO's Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia.
13. Captain (N) Jim Stavridis, USN, "They Got Game", *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1999, p. 52. In spring 1998 *HMCS Ottawa*, a Halifax-Class Frigate, was under the Tactical Command (TACOM) of the *USS Abraham Lincoln* (CVN-72) Battle Group during a deployment to the Persian Gulf. The *Ottawa* and her crew were described as being, "aggressive, well trained and absolutely expert in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)."
14. Some years ago, (then) Canadian Major Chris Hatfield, serving on exchange with the USN, was voted their top test pilot of the year. Our pilots clearly have the right stuff, and I do not think it would be a giant leap of faith to train ours to fly from carriers as well.
15. Norman Friedman, "US Army Goes Expeditionary", *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, February 2000, p. 4
16. Friedman, "US Army", p. 5
17. Major William F.P. Gresham, "Operational Maneuver (sic) From the Sea and the Single Battle Concept", *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 1996, p. 40.
18. Bryan Bender, "US DoD Seeks \$277.5 billion for FY 01", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 9 February 2000, p. 2.
19. *US Naval Doctrinal Publication 1*.
20. "Operational Maneuver (sic) From the Sea", Special Insert in *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 1996, p. A-1.
21. MGen Patrick G. Howard and Lt Col Len Blasiol, "OMFTS: Forging a Path to the Future of Amphibious Warfare", *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 1999, p. 21.
22. Colonel Mark F. Cancion USMCR, "Where is OMFTS Going?", *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 1999, p. 22.
23. Special Insert "A Concept for Advanced Expeditionary Fire Support-The System After Next", *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 1998, p. A-1.
24. <http://www.boeing.com/rotorcraft/military/v22/>.
25. Craig Hoyle and Greg Seigle, "Operational Evaluation Underway on MV-22", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Volume 32, Issue #15, 13 October 1999, p. 12.
26. LPD 17 Update, *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 1999, p. 6.
27. The Ottawa Convention on landmines does not, by definition extend to include mines at sea.
28. "Advanced Expeditionary Fire Support", p. A-6.
29. Ministry of Defence, "The Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for the Modern World" (Directorate of Information Strategy and News, 1998), p. 7.
30. http://www.mod.uk/news/prs/240_98.tm.
31. Damian Kemp, "Australian Navy LPAs Hit by Further Delays", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 24 November 1999, Volume 32, Issue 21, p. 18.
32. Sharon Hobson, "Canada set to harmonise with US export laws", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 20 October 1999, p. 21.

A Simple Tactical Problem:

"Auftragstaktik"

by Tacitus

MISE EN SCÈNE

You are commanding a unit that is part of an advancing force (Diagram 1). Your commander has been ordered to take control of the crossroads at Adorf. As you move to accomplish this, an enemy force only slightly smaller than the one you personally command appears on the left and threatens the mission (Diagram 2).




Your commander, as smooth as glass, orders you to eliminate the threat. As you move to do so, the enemy withdraws across the river and outside your boundaries.

WHAT DO YOU DO?

For the sake of simplicity, let us confine our solutions to one of the three following options:

- chase the enemy across the river and destroy him;
- seize the ground that the enemy was occupying; or
- establish a flank guard on your side of the river.

REMEMBER: Your solution must explain not only WHAT, WHERE and HOW but most importantly you must explain WHY.



The Stand-Up Table

Commentary, Opinion and Rebuttal

On an Educated Officer Corps... Commentary on "From the Managing Editor," Volume 3, No. 1, Spring 2000.

Major Bill Beaudoin, Chief Instructor of the Tactics School, CTC Gagetown writes:

I read with interest Captain Grodzinski's rationalization and explanation on the need for a university educated officer corps. Initially, the article appeared relatively innocuous, and it was not until the last paragraph that my interest was piqued. If this reaction was his intent, it was masterfully elicited. If not, oh well. However, if ever there was a fish hook dangled, surely it was in his concluding remarks as he summarized his perception of that chance encounter with the LFCSC II student—"Such questions arise from a fear of change and are merely a veiled expression of the desire to maintain the status quo." Given a nibble, the hook is then suitably yanked with his concluding comment, "Given the experience of the last few years, can we really afford to do so?" Within the context that I believe the author is using, this latter statement is either very naive, very arrogant or, at the very least, requires a tremendous intellectual leap of faith that borders on the sublime. Based on this, I must assume that none of the current woes "of the last few years" that the military has experienced (whatever he presumes them to be) would have happened, had *all* those leaders been blessed with "cap and gown." But I digress.

I would argue that any discussion on the concept of a university educated officer corps quickly tends to get somewhat emotional. This should be expected as it personally affects all of us in one form or another on a daily basis. I have attempted to avoid the "emotional pitfall" and, consequently, have rewritten this paragraph and, dare I say, article more times than I care to remember. I am not sure that I was totally successful in this endeavour.

Before I get into the formal aspects of my argument, I would like to lay a couple of ground rules. First of all, I will not be using any philosophical, witty, thought provoking, or charming quotations. While I appreciate that it is the "academic rage" these days, the simple point is that quotations can be found to show that "black is white" and, conversely, that "white is black" for the same theory, hypothesis, argument (you name it) being supported. Secondly, I accept that knowledge (any knowledge) is a treasured and valued commodity that should be cherished by all of us. I also know that the older you get the more you appreciate its true value and the effort to attain it. This is a thought worth pursuing more fully at another time. Thirdly, I am not going anywhere near the often-expressed feeling that a little more common sense (is this inherent or developed?) often is more valuable or treasured than any formal education. I am sure you have heard them all: "he's the most educated, stupid officer that I have met"; "if he spent a little bit more time practising the theories of leadership instead of studying them . . ."; or "all those letters after his name and he still can't..." The last one normally makes reference to "veiled expressions of sexual inability and houses of very low moral fibre." But I digress.

One of the difficulties with Captain Grodzinski's editorial (there are several) is that he never openly or clearly articulates "what our problems are." In failing to do so, however, he is free to definitively state that a "formal" education is a good way to start. Start what? Eradicate these unspecified and undefined problems? Let's examine his central theme that "The real aim of such

education [earlier described as a university education at the undergraduate level] is the development of thinking processes, the ability to think critically, analyze information and deliver reasoned written or articulated responses." Central to his argument is the fact that this can only be achieved through the noted formal education. If this were the case, then obviously the officer corps of the past (and I would suggest a good deal of the present) would have been (and is) an extremely sorry lot. Perhaps, this is one of the reasons we are currently sending a significant number of our senior officers off to get degrees. Without even discussing the issue of how many years they may or may not have left to contribute to the military, the question remains are we trying to create an aura of instant credibility? Or, are we in fact developing that future CEOs of various corporations? But I digress.

Captain Grodzinski unfortunately makes the common error of assuming that anything military (by virtue of what logic I don't know) cannot be academic in nature. I personally find such an assumption somewhat denigrating to those many "academics in uniform" that have educated me throughout my career and those institutions that have fostered an academic atmosphere. Let's be honest. Most of us understand the difference between training and education and the inherent need for both. His assertion, however, that the development of thought processes "is only facilitated by university trained staff" is absurd. With the same breath, it would appear that the only criteria for determining a successful military college is the number of academics (read non-uniformed personnel) on staff. What the author is doing is establishing a line that cannot be crossed. Specifically, he would have us believe that the military (individuals and institutions) is incapable of possessing/developing those

attributes that he describes and that academics are all of an equal calibre, demanding our respect only by the virtue of their qualifications. Would you expect a soldier to take the same approach to viewing his leadership? But I digress.

Contrary to Captain Grodzinski's assertion, I do not personally believe that most officers have a negative view of academia. In fact, I believe most of us have a healthy respect for it and those that strive for a university education do so with vigour. Yet, I also believe that a university education, or at least the pursuit of one, is being sold to a generation of officers without a full examination of what it will really provide in all cases (beyond the obvious promotion benefits). Unfortunately, at least from my perspective, it has not been sold convincingly enough. This is quite different from a fear of change or a desire to maintain the status quo that Captain Grodzinski indicates is typical of those that question their daily reality. I would have thought that a healthy scepticism would be a valuable asset in any officer. It certainly is for critical thinking. It is hard to convince me that a degree in "basket weaving" or some of the similarly demanding liberal programs are creating a generation of sharper, more intelligent officers. Even in the more educationally demanding arena of RMC, how many graduates (used only as an isolated example of the "university educated mind") have I met (commanded) that could not argue or write their way out of a paper bag, and a wet one at that. But I digress.

A pragmatic person might just say that the move towards a totally university educated officer corps is nothing less than historically what should be. Has not the officer corps traditionally been a reflection of a relevant period's societal elite? Does not the profession demand

it? Perhaps, this is the one social experiment that the military has lagged behind on. Regardless, one need not be a great scholar or academic to be cognizant of the fact that nobility, inherited rank, title, education, and purchased rank were just a few of the methods that "gentlemen" acquired military title down through the ages. To a large degree, the development of the Canadian military along traditional British lines reflected this exact condition. I suspect we would have been able to maintain this image had it not been for those "buggerances" known as the First and Second World Wars and the Korean Conflict. I am not sure what officer attributes were particularly valuable, or perhaps more importantly, viewed by their soldiers as being essential. Hopefully, should we ever really need them again, they will be there. But I digress.

The simple truth of the matter is that the military will move towards a totally university educated officer corps because we have been told to, not necessarily because there has been any demonstrated reason to do so. Do not get me wrong here. I am not advocating that university educated officers (particularly ones with relevant degrees) do anything but enhance the strength of the profession that we belong. The need is there and will always be there. One should look at big business, however, and see what value they put in a general university education. Often statistics are thrown about with relative ease that indicate the embarrassingly low percentage of officers possessing undergraduate degrees. This in itself is meaningless. It is somewhat arrogant, however, to suggest that an individual possessing a university degree has a higher sense of morals, loyalty, ethics, professionalism or dedication to duty and country than one without. Although the author has not explicitly

come out and said so, his comment regarding "the last few years" would appear to suggest just that. It would appear that professional competence and performance (vice academic achievements) are attributes that fall on the lower end of the "military needs scale" these days. But I digress.

With the continually shrinking military, the contemplation of further force structure reductions, the open-forum debates about whether tanks "are really necessary" or relevant anymore, the thought that one regiment of artillery is sufficient for the Army, one wonders what this highly educated officer corps is going to command. With real command being an increasingly scarce commodity, perhaps the attainment of a totally university educated officer corps is a desirable alternative. Whoa, starting to get a little too surreal there! We have embarked on a mission. The train has left the station. Pick a cliché. I understand that and I accept it. What I do not accept is the ease with which some people are easily categorized or labelled if they fail to recognize "the obvious." I do not believe that "...so many officers are uncomfortable with the prospect of a university education." What I suspect is that they, like me, are not fully convinced that this university education will give someone (and, by extension, the Army) a significant advantage in the next war for the reasons Captain Grodzinski indicates. And that is the crux of the matter. With the birth of the Enhanced Leadership Model, many would argue that we will be the most educated and schooled officer corps there is. Hopefully, it will yield the expected results when and where it is really needed.



Comments for the Open Forum on "Reality, The Other Side Of The Coin" by Major Dave MacLeod, ADTB, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring, 2000:

From Major Charles Branchaud, 12 Régiment blindé du Canada:

Not having had the opportunity to see the "world" from the same perspective as Major MacLeod, I would like to take the time to respond to some of his acerbic comments about the short article that I wrote in ADTB, Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter, 2000.

Of course we need tanks, Major MacLeod! We've been asking for them for decades, but we have to make do WITHOUT. It was recently proposed that the number of tanks be reduced to fourteen per squadron, in order to increase the number of tank squadrons per regiment. This is a very good proposal; however, we have to understand that this will only increase the number of tank squadrons to two for each regiment. The armoured BG could thus exist within a brigade, on the condition, however, that none of these squadrons be given to the infantry and, on the other hand, we allocate at least one company to the BG (losing a squadron would reduce a regimental commander to the role of a glorified combat team commander). Major MacLeod is right when he states that the minimum requirement would be three tank squadrons per regiment. I said the same thing in my article; three tank sub-units is the "minimum standard" that our allies use to define an armoured unit. Can we believe, however, that we will have three tank squadrons per regiment in the near future?

If we could indeed manage to reorganise ourselves to have two squadrons of fourteen tanks each per regiment, it would mark an amazing change in the lethargy that seems to afflict us. In the recent past, some armies have reduced

their strength (personnel and materiel) by a third and completely reorganised themselves in the space of a few years. Surely, to make a decision to reduce our squadrons to fourteen tanks and to increase the number of squadrons in each regiment should not be that difficult. For the moment, it certainly looks like we are going to maintain the current structure of two Coyote squadrons and only one tank squadron. Continuing to pass off light vehicles as tanks and not using them in a role that better suits them is absurd. Our current structure is much closer to being an armoured reconnaissance regiment than an armoured regiment. That is why I believe we should refocus the mission and the training of the "armoured" regiment, if we are going to maintain its current structure, i.e. with a preponderance of Coyotes. Major MacLeod will call me to order by telling me that an armoured reconnaissance regiment is only found at the level of divisional troops and not at the brigade level! In that case, either give us tanks or rethink how you want to use our *pseudo* armoured regiments. (It should be noted that prior to the arrival of the Cougars, the armoured regiments in Canada were in fact reconnaissance regiments).

As for the rest of your sarcasm, Major MacLeod, you will have to forgive my dialectic and maybe I haven't had the same experience as you ... Yet, if we look at the deployment in Kuwait ten years ago, the forces of the allied countries were given missions that corresponded to their capabilities. What mattered to "THE" allied leader of that coalition, was to legitimise his actions against Iraq, by having the largest possi-

ble number of countries in his camp. Whether those countries contributed an armoured division or a field hospital, does not seem to have been a subject for great concern...

France, for example, was given a task corresponding to the capabilities of the equipment of its light armoured division, which was to secure the left flank of the allied advance. Not a negligible task and one that was carried out effectively, considering the distance to be covered before the heavy divisions engaged. So I don't think there is much point in going on about wonderful theories on the magnitude of the Canadian contribution that our allies will be willing, not willing to accept. They will make do with what we have to offer them. In my opinion, if at the moment, we have only LAVs to commit, we should know how to exploit the strengths and weaknesses of this type of materiel rather than training in it as a "tank" with vehicles that aren't tanks and thereby learning false lessons. As for whether we should be doctrine "driven" or "drive" the doctrine, I leave that debate to the military "theoricians"; I am a field man.

Finally, to respond to your question about armoured reconnaissance BG ... I would like to draw your attention to the organisation of a Cavalry Regiment "squadron" in the United States but we might already be talking too much about this "cavalry" notion. I would suggest as an example, the British armoured reconnaissance BGs in Bosnia in the summer of 1999 which had, in addition to their reconnaissance squadrons, an infantry company and a squadron of tanks in attachment.



Books of Interest

A Listing of Recent Publications

CANADIAN TOPICS

Bland, Douglas L., Ed. *Backbone of the Army: Non-Commissioned Officers in the Future Army*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-88911-889-2.

Cameron, David R. *The Referendum Papers: Essays on Secession and National Unity*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000. ISBN 0-8020-4449-2.

Graves, Donald E., Ed. *Fighting for Canada: Seven Battles, 1758 - 1945*. Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2000. ISBN 1-89641-16-8.

Mahant, Edelgard; Mount, Graham S. *Invisible and Inaudible in Washington: American Policies Toward Canada*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999. ISBN 0-7748-0703-2.

Margolin, Howard. *Unauthorized Entry: The Truth About Nazi War Criminals in Canada: 1946 - 1956*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000. ISBN 0-8020-4277-5.

Marteinson, John; McNorgan, Michael with Sean Maloney. *The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps: An Illustrated History*. Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2000. ISBN 1-896941-17-6.

Tucker, Michael J.; Blake, Raymond B; and Bryden, P.E. *Canada and the New World Order: Facing the New Millennium*. Toronto: Irwin Publishing Ltd, 2000. ISBN 0-7725-2827-6.

POLITICAL AND STRATEGICAL ISSUES

Weller, Marc. *The Crisis in Kosovo 1989 - 1999: From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia to Rambouillet and the Outbreak of Hostilities. International Documents and Analysis, Volume 1*. Cambridge (UK): Documents and Analysis Publishing Ltd, 1999. ISBN 1-903033-00-4.

DOCTRINE AND THEORY

No new titles received.

ETHICS

Toner, James H. *Morals Under the Gun: The Cardinal Virtues, Military Ethics and American Society*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000. ISBN 0-8131-2159-0.

ANCIENT TO EARLY MODERN PERIODS

Levine, Alan J. *The War Against Rommel's Supply Lines, 1942 - 1943*. Westport: Praeger, 1999. ISBN 0-275-96521-X.

Lund, Erik A. *War for the Every Day: Generals, Knowledge and Warfare in Early Modern Europe, 1680 - 1740*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999. ISBN 0-313-31041-6.

Nester, William R. *The Great Frontier War: Britain, France and the Imperial Struggle for North America, 1607 - 1755*. Westport: Praeger, 2000. ISBN 0-275-96772-7.

Nester, William R. *The First Global War, 1756-1775: Britain, France and the Fate of North America*. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc, 2000. ISBN 0-275-96771-9.

TWENTIETH CENTURY CONFLICT

Benton, Gregor. *Mountain Fires: The Red Army's Three-Year War in South China, 1934 - 1938*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. ISBN 0-520-04158-5.

Evans, Martin Marix. *The Boer War: South Africa, 1899 - 1902*. London: Osprey Military, 1999. ISBN 1-85532-851-8.

Whitaker, Brigadier-General Denis, Shelagh Whitaker with Terry Copp. *Victory at Falaise: The Soldiers' Story*. Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000. ISBN 0-00-200017-2 (Cloth), 0-00-638498-6 (Paper).

Laqueur, Walter. *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. ISBN 0-19-511816-2.

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

Taylor, Eric R. *Lethal Mists: An Introduction to the Natural and Military Sciences of Chemical, Biological Warfare and Terrorism*. Commack: Nova Science Publishers, Inc, 1999. ISBN 1-56072-459-5.

UNITED NATIONS, PEACEKEEPING, OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Biermann, Wolfgang and Martin Vadset, Eds. *UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1999. ISBN 0-7546-1026-8.

Bonn, Lieutenant-Colonel Keith E. and Master-Sergeant Anthony E Baker. *Guide to Military Operations Other Than War: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Stability and Support Operations, Domestic and International*. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000. ISBN 0-8117-2939-7.

Schmidl, Erwin A. *Peace Operations Between War and Peace*. London: Frank Cass, 2000. ISBN 0-7146-8052-4.

Siegel, Pascale Combelles. *Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations; NATO Led Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 1995 - 1997*. Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, 2000? ISBN 1-57906-008-0.

GENERAL

Aron, Leon. *Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life*. New York: St Martin's Press, 2000. ISBN 0-312-25185-8.

Baxter, Colin F. *Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, 1887 - 1976: A Selected Bibliography*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999. ISBN 0-313-29119-5.

Hechter, Michael. *Containing Nationalism*. London: Oxford University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-19-829742-4.

Mercier, Peter J. and Judith D Mercier. *Battle Cries on the Home Front: Violence in the Military Family*. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas Publisher Ltd, 2000. ISBN 0-398-07034-2.

